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[Wittgenstein] once greeted me with the question: “Why do people 
say that it was natural to think that the sun went round the earth 
rather than that the earth turned on its axis?” I replied: “I sup-
pose, because it looked as if the sun went round the earth.” “Well,” 
he asked, “what would it have looked like if it had looked as if the 
earth turned on its axis?”1
INTRODUCTION
 Although Ben has discussed my work in print before,2 this is the 
first occasion I have had to return the favor by discussing his. We 
have been discussing philosophy for more than forty years, so my re-
marks are, at least in that sense, long overdue. John, too, has written 
about my work, both with Ben3 and on his own,4 and we have had 
many conversations about our respective work, most of them consist-
ing of my insisting that we don’t disagree, and John’s attempting to 
articulate the sense in which we do. This, too, is an overdue oppor-
tunity for me to return the favor.  
 Having been slotted into a session on John and Ben’s views about 
corrective justice, my focus will be what I will suggest are their mis-
understandings of it. In the past I’ve tried to convince them that their 
illuminating account of civil recourse is not an alternative to a correc-
?  Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Toronto. I am grateful to Peter 
Benson, Paul Hurley, Dennis Klimchuk, Jason Nyers, and Stephen Smith for comments on 
an earlier draft, and to Ernest Weinrib and Ben Zipursky both for comments and, even 
more so, for many decades of conversations. 
 1.  G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, AN INTRODUCTION TO WITTGENSTEIN’S TRACTATUS 151 (1959).  
 2.  Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695 
passim (2003). 
 3.  John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917 
passim (2010). 
 4.  John C.P. Goldberg, Rights and Wrongs, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1828 passim (1999); 
John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513 passim (2003). 
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tive justice view, but either a complement to it or a component of it. 
Still, Goldberg and Zipursky repeatedly use the idea of corrective jus-
tice as a foil against which to contrast their own view of civil re-
course. Most of their case against corrective justice consists in varia-
tions on the claim that if corrective justice were the organizing struc-
ture of tort law, it would look very different than it does.  
My purpose here is to set the record straight on corrective justice 
and to show that the empirical features of tort law for which correc-
tive justice is putatively unable to account are actually direct expres-
sions of it. The same four allegations show up again and again in 
their writing, but, with respect to each of them, Goldberg and 
Zipursky have not only failed to establish their case, but have failed 
to so much as state a cause of action. If the doctrinal structure of the 
law is exactly as they contend, each feature to which they draw at-
tention is consistent with corrective justice. Three of the four allega-
tions focus on remedies; they seem much more nearly ready to accept 
the corrective justice account of wrongs. But the burden of my argu-
ment will be to show that the corrective justice account of wrongs 
generates the corrective justice account of remedies and, further, that 
properly understood, the idea of recourse is the appropriate way of 
instantiating the corrective justice account.  
 Goldberg and Zipursky seek to separate civil recourse from correc-
tive justice by showing that tort law, at least as it is found in the 
United States of America, does not work in the ways in which correc-
tive justice theory says that it must. The strategy of separation, in 
turn, rests on a separation between wrongs and remedies, a separa-
tion between ideas of risk and ideas of ordinariness, a separation be-
tween abstract characterizations of rights and contingent social 
norms, and, finally, a separation between a wrong done against the 
plaintiff and her power to exact a remedy. I shall argue that none of 
these separations can be made. 
 Before doing so, however, some preliminary matters must be ad-
dressed. The first of these is that the term “corrective” sounds irre-
deemably and irremediably remedial. Whether this is so of course 
depends on how it is understood, but distinguished scholars of tort 
law, including Jules Coleman and Stephen Perry, have, in the pro-
cess of articulating an alternative to the economic analysis of tort 
law, used the term “corrective justice” to refer to what is arguably a 
remedial view, a view that is supposed to explain why defendant 
owes plaintiff a duty to repair harms for which defendant is respon-
sible. Indeed, Coleman goes so far as to compare the principle of cor-
rective justice to the principle of retributive justice and to character-
ize both as principles that do not presuppose a unique characteriza-
tion of the nature of wrongdoing, and so, at least in principle, as con-
sistent with a variety of different accounts of the nature of the 
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wrongs to be corrected.5 Perry, by contrast, characterizes it in terms 
of the correction of harms for which the tortfeasor is responsible, 
where that responsibility, in turn, is to be analyzed in terms of hav-
ing had an adequate capacity and opportunity to avoid causing those 
harms.6 It is not my purpose here to engage with the important work 
of Coleman and Perry or to examine its relation to that of Goldberg 
and Zipursky; unlike some others, they do not criticize corrective jus-
tice for being merely remedial.7 I mention it here only by way of con-
trast with the account I will be developing.  
 In order to mark that contrast more clearly and, more generally, 
to avoid these distracting apparent implications of the term “correc-
tive justice,” I had thought to call it instead “co-rective justice,” that 
is, the justice of right between persons. Since that is cumbersome 
and, when overheard in conversation, still misleading, I then thought 
it might be a good idea to shorten it to “rective justice” or, for purpos-
es of brevity of expression, just to “rect.” Unfortunately, my bilingual 
spellchecker keeps changing that to “recht,” Kant’s word for “right,” 
so I will use the vocabulary of corrective justice and the vocabulary of 
right interchangeably. 
 Second, Zipursky and Goldberg also criticize my colleague Ernest 
Weinrib’s specific formulation of corrective justice on the grounds of 
it being excessively metaphysical, and, in so doing, thereby failing to 
come to terms with the fact that tort law is a human institution.8 In 
its place they recommend what they call “pragmatic conceptualism,” 
which focuses on the conceptual structure of tort law, but does so in a 
way that purports to be less metaphysically laden and leaden. I will 
have more to say in what follows about pragmatic conceptualism.9 My 
own characterization of right will be avowedly conceptual and, I 
hope, for present purposes, adequately pragmatic. I will work with a 
minimal conception of what it is to give a conceptual account: to focus 
on a legal area in conceptual terms is to characterize the form of rea-
soning in which its characteristic concepts figure and the inferential 
 5.  JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST 
APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 31-34 (2001). 
 6.  See generally Stephen R. Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of 
Torts, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 72 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001). 
 7.  See, e.g., Gregory C. Keating, Is Tort a Remedial Institution? (Univ. S. Cal. Law, 
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 10-10 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1633687. 
 8.  Zipursky characterizes Weinrib’s formalism as “metaphysically elaborate and 
antipragmatic.” Benjamin C. Zipursky, Pragmatic Conceptualism, 6 LEGAL THEORY 457, 
458 (2000). The word “pragmatic” is spoken in many ways, but I take Zipursky’s contention 
to be that Weinrib overlooks the contingency that runs through legal institutions. He later 
sets out what he takes to be the requirement for a proper conceptual theory: “independence 
from metaphysically rich notions in explaining and expounding the theory.” Id. at 469 n.45.  
 9.  Bear in mind that avoiding metaphysics is much more difficult than denouncing 
it. As Allen Wood once remarked to me, “Empiricism is the a priori theory that there is no 
a priori knowledge.” 
166 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol 39:163
relations between them. To say that they figure in a form of reason-
ing is to say that they figure in a certain way, independent of the 
particular matter to which the reasoning is applied. Rather than at-
tempt to reduce these abstract concepts to other types of concepts 
that are thought to have, for example, a better empirical or scientific 
pedigree or to replace them with such concepts or to do entirely with-
out the concept of a concept and focus exclusively on the empirical 
psychology of decisionmaking,10 my conceptual account will focus on 
how those concepts figure in reasoning. In order to deflect any accu-
sations of being excessively metaphysical, I take no stand here on 
what, exactly, concepts are, or where they reside, or even about 
whether talk about concepts residing is a helpful metaphor. In keep-
ing with my concern to avoid metaphysical side issues, I will also 
avoid all reference to the concept of a “practice” which seems to me to 
be at least as empirically dubious and as packed with metaphysical 
subtleties and theological niceties as anything to be found in any of 
Aristotle, Kant, or Hegel.11 Again, it is sometimes said that the rea-
sons that courts give are mere window dressing for conclusions 
reached on some other basis. In offering a conceptual account, I will 
take those reasons at face value, since the charge of window dressing 
almost always reflects a general assumption that the reasons offered 
by courts provide no guidance in deciding cases. But the only way to 
assess that allegation is to look at the reasoning in which the reasons 
characteristically figure. In what follows, I assume that Zipursky and 
Goldberg intend their account to be conceptual in the same sense. 
 Third, Goldberg and Zipursky acknowledge the importance of the 
corrective justice critique of economic and other instrumental ap-
proaches to law. That critique, as formulated initially by Weinrib and 
Coleman, argues in its broadest form that economic analysis is one-
sided in a way that makes it unable to explain the most basic and 
familiar features of tort law.12 By focusing only on the question of 
what incentives will lead defendant to take the appropriate level of 
precaution, economic analysis is unable to explain why plaintiff, in 
 10.  See, e.g., WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT (1960); W.V. Quine, 
Epistemology Naturalized, in ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY & OTHER ESSAYS 69 (1969) (argu-
ing against the “idea idea” in the philosophy of language); BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING 
JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHI-
LOSOPHY (2007) (applying Quine’s philosophical naturalism to issues in legal philosophy). 
 11.  I do not mean to deny that there are useful ways to talk about practices, as when 
an organization generates a list of “best practices” for handling a certain type of recurring 
issue, or when the House of Lords issued a “Practice Statement” explaining its decision to 
entertain the possibility of overturning its own precedents. My objection is only to the 
thought that talk about social practices provides any illumination of such well-worn philo-
sophical concepts as that of a norm, or a rule, rather than presupposing those concepts. 
 12.  See ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 46-48 (1995); see also JULES L.
COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL
THEORY 20-21 (2001); Jules L. Coleman, The Structure of Tort Law, 97 YALE L.J. 1233, 
1245 (1988). 
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particular, should be the one who recovers those damages, and equal-
ly unable to explain why the measure of those damages should be 
plaintiff’s injury. Other instrumentalist accounts, including those 
that focus on compensation in addition to deterrence, introduce the 
plaintiff into their analysis but face a different version of the same 
difficulty. In addition to being unable to explain why a plaintiff, in 
particular, should be the one charged with policing defendant’s con-
duct, they double their difficulties by also being unable to explain 
why defendant, in particular, should be the one charged with com-
pensating plaintiff. The corrective justice critique of instrumental 
accounts does not deny that those accounts are able to generate elab-
orate explanations of incentive structures, administrative conven-
ience, and so on. Their difficulty, from the point of view of the correc-
tive justice critique, is that they render the basic structure of a tort 
action, in which plaintiff recovers from defendant because defendant 
has wronged her, as merely coincidental. On an instrumentalist ac-
count, plaintiff’s allegation that she is entitled to a remedy because 
she has been wronged by defendant plays no part in the court’s reso-
lution of the dispute between them; indeed, for an instrumentalist, 
the dispute between the parties that the court purports to resolve is 
not the ground of defendant’s liability to plaintiff at all. It is simply a 
convenient opportunity to pursue some other purpose. This is not on-
ly a failure to emphasize what the corrective justice theorists think 
most important; it is a failure to recognize the force of the “because” 
in the formulation “plaintiff recovers from defendant because defend-
ant has wronged her.” The central claim of corrective justice is that a 
private dispute is to be resolved exclusively in terms of the transac-
tion between the parties, what one person has wrongfully done to an-
other, rather than on one or both of what one has wrongly done, and 
what has happened to another. 
 Goldberg and Zipursky acknowledge the fundamental importance 
of the corrective justice critique of economic analysis and their broad 
debts to the work of corrective justice scholars more generally.13 By 
building on it they have played a central role in the reinvigoration of 
discussions of duty in American legal scholarship. Their objection 
seeks to adopt the same focus on the mode of reasoning in order to 
show that corrective justice fails to account for the structure of tort 
law. The dialectical structure of the debate thus comes down to this: 
starting off with the idea that tort law is, as Goldberg and Zipursky 
put it, “a law of wrongs,”14 does this show that it is a structure of cor-
rective justice, of civil recourse, or both? 
 13.  See generally Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 3.   
 14.  Id. at 918, 985. See also John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law 
and Moral Luck, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1123 (2007). 
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 Against this background, and putting to one side the charge of be-
ing merely remedial and the accusation of excessive metaphysical 
ambitions, by my count, Goldberg and Zipursky offer four arguments 
that are supposed to show that the corrective justice account fails to 
capture the fundamental structural and conceptual features of tort 
law. The first of these is the charge that corrective justice cannot ac-
count for the diversity of different interests protected by tort law.15
Coming from the opposite direction, the second is that it cannot ac-
count for the diversity of different remedies given by courts when 
wrongs are committed.16 The third is that corrective justice theory 
cannot explain why a tort suit is initiated by the aggrieved plaintiff, 
that is, why the plaintiff has the power to proceed against the de-
fendant who she alleges has wronged her, rather than the state step-
ping in to correct the injustice done by defendant.17 Fourth, and final-
ly, Goldberg and Zipursky charge that in the tort of negligence, cor-
rective justice is unable to explain the way in which ordinariness fig-
ures in the characterization of reasonable care.18 Although Goldberg 
and Zipursky refer to the first of these four challenges as the “hodge-
podge” problem, I do not think that the four challenges themselves 
are merely a hodgepodge. Indeed, I think that three of them are ex-
plicitly variations on a single theme, according to which corrective 
justice is insufficiently attentive to the role of social and institutional 
contingency in the law. The fourth, concerning the role of the state, 
and the nature of the private power exercised by an aggrieved plain-
tiff, is partially distinct, but even it points to a distinctive feature of 
contemporary legal institutions and charges that the corrective jus-
tice account makes this feature unintelligible. The challenges are 
supposed to add up to the conclusion that rather than a system of 
corrective justice, “tort is a civilized alternative to vengeance–civil 
recourse for the plaintiff, which is appropriately channeled through 
and cabined by law.”19 Were they successful, the challenges would 
show that tort law is not a matter of corrective justice, but a mere 
cabining of impulses to which a civilized society dares not give free rein.  
 My aim in this Article will be to show that none of the objections 
holds up. All rest on a misguided conceptualization of corrective jus-
tice. Having accepted the relational nature of wrongdoing and the 
fundamental importance of wrongs to the law of tort, Goldberg and 
Zipursky give up on the idea of relational wrongs too quickly. Each of 
the objections does not introduce a counterexample to the corrective 
 15.  Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 3, at 954-57. 
 16.  Id. at 960-63. 
 17.  Id. at 957-60. 
 18.  Id. at 978. 
 19.  John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Seeing Tort Law from the Internal 
Point of View: Holmes and Hart on Legal Duties, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1563, 1581 (2006). 
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justice account, but rather points to the specific way in which the ab-
stract concepts of private right may be realized in determinate human 
institutions. From the standpoint of the conceptual account, this is 
all for the good, since, as I will also show, the cabining of impulses is 
not something of which a relational conceptual account could be given. 
 The Article is structured as follows: Part I sets out, in brief and 
highly abstract terms, a conceptual account of Kantian Right.20 Part 
II provides a characterization of what it is to remedy a private wrong 
from the standpoint of Kantian Right. Part III explains why these 
abstract ideas of right require concrete instantiation in legal institu-
tions. Part IV returns to the four challenges Goldberg and Zipursky 
raise and shows that each of them can be understood as not merely a 
possible instantiation but, fundamentally, the central instantiation of 
the abstract ideas in legal institutions. Part V concludes with some 
reflections on conceptualism and contingency. 
I. PRIVATE WRONGS
 Private law governs relations between private persons; the private 
law of tort protects person, property, and reputation against wrongs 
by other private persons. For purposes of exposition, and reasons of 
space, I will put torts involving reputation to one side.21 In character-
 20.  IMMANUEL KANT, Metaphysical First Principals of the Doctrine of Right, in THE 
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS Ak. 6:205, at 35 (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 
1991) (1797). I develop Kant’s account of private right in more detail in ARTHUR RIPSTEIN,
FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (2009). The Kantian view 
developed here is not to be confused with the view that Goldberg and Zipursky characterize 
as Kantianism, which they say has “[r]ightly or wrongly” been taken to insist that “insofar 
as one is in the business of identifying genuine wrongs (rather than using the term 
‘wrongs’ as an empty placeholder), one must focus on acts and not results lest mere hap-
penstance be allowed to infect what should be non-contingent judgments of right and 
wrong.” Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 3, at 936, 942. For Kant, a wrong is an interfer-
ence with another’s freedom; as such, wrong is relational and always necessarily comprehends 
a transaction between two parties, rather than any monadic feature of either of them. 
 21.  A few words are in order, if only to preempt any suggestion that I do so because a 
Kantian view cannot explain wrongs against reputation: torts of defamation protect your 
right to your own good name, which is, as Kant remarks, an innate right (one that does not 
require an affirmative act to establish it) that exists only externally (in the words and 
thoughts of others.) See KANT, supra note 20, Ak. 6:295, at 111-12. Wrongs against reputa-
tion involve using a person’s reputation in a way that he or she has not authorized. They 
are, to use the terminology developed below, trespass-based. That is why no showing of 
either fault or harm is required, and why, in the absence of harm, general damages are 
assessed. Most significantly, you do not have a right to reputation because reputation is 
useful to you. Instead, you have a right to reputation regardless of whether it is useful to 
you or not, but you have a claim against those who interfere with it because you have a 
right, not because it is useful. That is why defamation must always be about and concern-
ing the plaintiff in particular. The plaintiff herself might well suffer loss or disadvantage 
because of damage done to the reputation of another. But that does not give rise to a cause 
of action. Your reputation is something you already have, which is yours to develop and 
provides the basis on which others decide whether to interact with you and on what terms. 
I plan to take these topics up in more detail in “Your Own Good Name,” a chapter of AR-
THUR RIPSTEIN, PRIVATE WRONGS: TORT LAW AS PHILOSOPHY (forthcoming 2014).  
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izing those wrongs, private right is concerned exclusively with the 
means that a person uses, and abstracts completely from the ends 
being pursued through the use of those means. As the law of wrongs, 
tort law’s focus on the means a person has, and the ways in which he 
or she is entitled to use them, both sets the problem to which it is the 
solution and generates the contours of that solution. 
 Private right is concerned with means in two senses. First, the 
interests that it characteristically protects—person and property—
are protected as means, that is, as the conditions of a person’s ongo-
ing capacity to set and pursue purposes, rather than as aspects of a 
person’s well-being. Private right begins with the familiar idea that 
in order to set and pursue a purpose, you must take yourself to have 
means available that you take to be sufficient to achieve it. You can 
wish for something that you have no means of achieving, but you can 
only choose to do something by taking up means towards it. Your 
means may prove inadequate, or circumstances may frustrate you. 
Or perhaps it turns out that you succeed but come to regret having 
chosen the path that you did. But to act for the sake of achieving an 
end, you need to use means. The means that you have are, from the 
point of view of the law of tort, just your own person, that is, your 
bodily powers and mental capacities (as well as your reputation) and 
whatever things outside of your body which are yours, that is, your 
property. Your property counts as your means because you alone, as 
against other private persons, are entitled to determine the purposes 
for which it will be used. That is why someone can wrong you by us-
ing your property without your permission, even if you suffer no 
measurable loss. Again, although there is something potentially mis-
leading about saying that you have your own physical and mental 
powers merely as means, the misleading impression can be allayed 
by focusing on the contrastive sense in which this is intended. To say 
that they are yours, as against others, is finally to say that you, ra-
ther than anyone else, are the one who gets to decide how they will 
be used. That is, once more, why you can be wronged if somebody 
touches you without your authorization: that person uses your per-
son—your body—for a purpose that you have not set.  
 In characterizing your entitlement in terms of the means that you 
have, private right pays no attention to the ends for which you might 
use those means. Against this background, it is misleading to charac-
terize private right as protecting interests, if this is taken to mean 
that the interests protected have normative significance, or can even 
be characterized, apart from the rights that protect them. To the con-
trary, each person’s entitlement to use his or her own means, and 
determine how they will be used, gets its normative significance from 
being part of a system of rights, that is, a system of restrictions on 
each person’s behavior in which each may enjoy independence from 
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all of the others. The idea of independence is itself relational; rela-
tional rights are not granted to protect interests taken to matter 
apart from them; interests are protected on the basis of rights. 
 These rights are relational in a highly specific sense: they involve 
non-comparative relations. If I say that one ball is heavier or hotter 
than another, I relate them to each other comparatively; each has a 
mass and temperature apart from the other and could have that 
mass and temperature if it were the only thing that ever existed. If I 
characterize someone as an uncle, I am describing him in relation to 
some niece or nephew; nobody is an uncle to any degree whatsoever 
except in relation to the offspring of his siblings, and anyone who is 
an uncle at all is entirely an uncle; unclehood does not come in de-
grees. “Wrong” is like “uncle,” not like “mass” or “temperature.” In 
characterizing an act as a wrong or a person as a wrongdoer, the law 
of tort works with a non-comparatively relational conception of 
wrongs. It follows from this that although the object of a right such as 
your horse or your right arm will have a magnitude and a degree in 
the sense that it is what it is apart from juridical relations to others, 
your right to it has neither a magnitude nor a degree. It is your enti-
tlement to constrain the conduct of others in a certain way, which 
you either have or lack with respect to a given object. That is the 
sense in which private right is to be characterized in terms of a form 
of reasoning: the rights figure in reasoning in the same way, as a 
constraint on the conduct of others apart from the specifics of the object 
of the right. Neither how bad it would be for you to have a right vio-
lated or how burdensome it would be for others to be constrained by 
it is relevant to its existence. Rights in private law are relational and 
all reasoning about them reflects and preserves their relational nature.  
 A purely relational right does not serve to protect an interest in 
your means that can be characterized apart from the right that pro-
tects it; to the contrary, the sense in which your means are your own 
is that you alone, as against others, are entitled to determine the 
purposes for which they will be used. Your right is the constraint on 
the conduct of others, and if someone violates your right, the con-
straint on that person’s conduct survives and provides the basis for 
the remedy. 
 Second, as well as characterizing the interests protected by the 
law of tort in terms of the means that you have and your concomitant 
entitlement to decide which purposes to pursue, the restrictions im-
posed by the law of tort restrict the means that others may use. Just 
as the entitlement to your person and property does not depend on 
the purposes for which you are using them, so, too, the restrictions on 
others imposed by your right to person and property do not depend 
on the purposes that those others might be pursuing. Wrongs against 
person and property restrict the use of means in two straightforward 
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senses: First of all, the law of tort prohibits trespasses of all forms. 
You are not entitled to use or even touch another person’s body or 
property without that person’s permission, and you are not allowed to 
do so quite apart from whatever worthy or unworthy purpose you 
might be pursuing. Second, you are not entitled to injure other peo-
ple, either in their person or their property, by using your own prop-
erty in ways that characteristically cause such injuries.  
 The first set of restrictions generates a wide variety of trespass-
based torts; the second set generates what I have elsewhere de-
scribed as “harm-based” torts, including both nuisance and negli-
gence. In a trespass-based wrong, liability is premised on defendant’s 
use of plaintiff’s person or property. Defendant need only intend to 
use something that is another’s, and a trespass can be committed, 
even if defendant did not, or even could not, know the title of the 
thing being used.22 This structure is clearest in the case of simple 
trespass to land, which is a wrong against the owner of the land, even 
in cases in which the trespasser made an honest or even unavoidable 
mistake with respect to title or the location of the boundary line. The 
same structure applies in trespasses against chattels and, at least in 
principle, with respect to trespass against persons, even if, as it turns 
out, there are few cases in which defendant has made an innocent 
mistake as to whether this particular person had authorized the 
touching in question. The absence of any requirement that defendant 
should have known in trespass follows from the fact that each per-
son’s entitlement to use his or her means to set and pursue his or her 
own purposes can be exercised consistently with everyone else using 
their own means, and each person’s entitlement to use those means 
does not shade over into any entitlement whatsoever to use means 
belonging to another. The structure of trespass is formal in that the 
nature of the right at issue, and so of the wrongs that violate it, can 
be characterized apart from the specifics of the object of the right.  
 In harm-based torts, by contrast, rights are qualified in part on 
what the defendant should have thought about. Harm-based torts 
concern the side effects of one person’s use of his or her own means 
on the ability of others to continue using their own means. For exam-
ple, the tort of nuisance is organized around the thought that a land-
owner’s use and enjoyment of his or her own land will inevitably have 
side effects on his or her neighbors. Something counts as an actiona-
 22.  Goldberg characterizes trespass as “a tort that combines an element of inten-
tionality with an element of strict liability.” John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status 
of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE 
L.J. 524, 598 (2005). The characterization of liability as strict makes things unduly compli-
cated; the wrong consists in using what belongs to another, not in failure to take account 
of something. So, too, with the characterization of intentionality; you can only use some-
thing intentionally.  
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ble side effect if it interferes with the neighbor’s ability to use and 
enjoy his or her own land. Given that some side effects are inevitable, 
the question of whether a particular side effect constitutes a nuisance 
turns into the question of whether it is excessive in relation to the 
ability of a plurality of neighbors to each use and enjoy his or her own 
land, consistent with the ability of other neighbors to do the same.  
 In the tort of negligence, the same general form of reasoning pro-
hibits people from injuring each other’s means through dangerous 
use of their own means. As people use their means, whether their 
own bodies or chattels, some side effects on others are inevitable, in-
cluding injuries to others. The law of negligence characterizes the 
relations between persons that give rise to restrictions on how each 
may permissibly use his or her own means and enters into the de-
termination of whether defendant’s conduct was too dangerous, that 
is, whether it was of a type that, in the circumstances, was too likely 
to interfere with plaintiff’s security of his or her means. Once more 
the account is formal: whether defendant has wrongfully damaged or 
destroyed plaintiff’s means is determined in abstraction from the 
particular features of those means, and so apart from how bad it is 
for plaintiff to be deprived of them, or how costly it was for defendant 
to avoid damaging them.  
 This austere structure of protecting each person’s means against 
use by others, or damage through the excessive side effects of other 
people’s use of their means, generates the familiar structure of the 
law of tort. Most importantly, it generates the fundamental distinc-
tion between nonfeasance and misfeasance, that is, between wrong-
ing someone and failing to confer a benefit on that person. To inter-
fere with what another person already has is a wrong, but to fail to 
provide aid to that person, no matter how badly that person needs it, 
is not. Again, to interfere with someone’s person or property is a 
wrong, but to fail to protect that person or property is not. And, to 
interfere with something upon which another person depends but 
does not own is not a wrong. Most significantly, a bad motive—the 
pursuit of a worthless or evil end—does not make an otherwise per-
missible act wrongful.23 Thus, the Holmesian doctrine of prima facie
tort sits uneasily with torts as a law of wrongs.  
 These distinctions reflect the way in which private right is funda-
mentally a doctrine of means. That is why if someone needs some-
thing, but has no way of getting it, private right takes no interest. 
Private right only protects what people already have. For the same 
reason, if you carelessly or even maliciously destroy something upon 
 23.  I take this issue up in detail in Arthur Ripstein, Motive and Intention in Tort 
Law, Lecture Before the Tort Law Research Group, Faculty of Law, University of Western 
Ontario (Nov. 3, 2010). 
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which another person depends, but does not own, you do no wrong as 
against that person, but wrong only the owner of the object. As a sys-
tematic doctrine of means, private right represents all questions of 
entitlement, whether to the security of your means or the scope with-
in which you may use them, in purely relational terms. You do not 
have a right that your means be secure; you have only a right that 
others not damage them by acting in characteristically damaging 
ways; you do no wrong by using your means dangerously if you do not 
injure another’s means. That is just to say that your entitlement to 
your means constrains other persons as their entitlement to theirs 
constrains you. 
 This structure of means is central to Goldberg and Zipursky’s oth-
er signature contribution to contemporary tort theory, their emphasis 
on the fundamental role of duty in the law of negligence. Each per-
son’s right to person and property is also thereby correlative to a duty 
on the part of others to avoid interfering with person and property. 
The “duty question,” so prominent in negligence cases in the early 
part of the twentieth century, still prominent in Commonwealth legal 
systems, and, until Goldberg and Zipursky’s intervention, very much 
on the defensive in American law, concerns whether plaintiff and de-
fendant are in the right relationship to give rise to a legal obliga-
tion.24 The “no duty” cases are all cases in which plaintiff fails to 
state a cause of action either by failing to allege,25 or by alleging but 
failing to establish,26 that the vulnerability of her means generated a 
prospective constraint on defendant’s conduct. If defendant owed 
plaintiff no duty, then, whatever the other defects in defendant’s ac-
tion, and whenever the loss to plaintiff occasioned by the defective 
action, no wrong has taken place. 
 In the same way, the causation requirement for all harm-based 
torts reflects the fact that tort law is a doctrine of means. You do not 
wrong another person by doing something that is prone or even likely 
to interfere with her means; you only wrong her if you interfere with 
those means. Merely putting those means at risk is consistent with 
another person being able to use them as he or she sees fit.  
 For the same reason, not just any causal relation between defend-
ant’s conduct and plaintiff’s loss constitutes a wrong. An injury is on-
ly wrongful if it is within the ambit of the risk that makes defend-
ant’s conduct negligent. If defendant did not need to look out for a 
 24.  See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky , The Restatement (Third) 
and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657 (2001); John C.P. Goldberg 
& Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733, 1745-77 (1998).
 25.  See Winterbottom v. Wright, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch. of Pleas); Palsgraf v. 
Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
 26.  See H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1928); Childs v. 
Desormeaux, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 643 (Can.). 
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particular aspect of plaintiff’s safety, loss to that aspect is not the re-
alization of a wrong, no matter how defective defendant’s conduct or 
serious plaintiff’s loss. Remoteness—what American courts call 
“proximate cause”—is relational because risk is.  
 This characterization of private right as a doctrine of means is 
conceptual in Zipursky’s intended sense since it characterizes the 
broad doctrinal structure of private right in terms of the interrelations 
between a set of concepts regarding the ways in which each person 
can use his or her own means to set and pursue his or her own pur-
poses and is bound only by the entitlement of others to do the same.  
 In laying out the structure of right, I have focused on the way in 
which one person’s entitlement to what he or she already has con-
strains the conduct of others. These constraints, in turn, generate the 
concept of a wrong, which is just an action inconsistent with anoth-
er’s entitlements. Because the entitlements are constraints on the 
conduct of others, the wrongs are always relational; private right 
asks not what someone has done, or what has happened, but what 
one person has done to another. 
 The characteristic questions that courts ask in processing a tort 
action reflect this conceptual structure, and facts enter into the 
court’s determinations as premises in reasoning within this structure. 
In harm-based torts, questions of duty, remoteness, and standard of 
care (or their analogues)27 all focus on the structure of plaintiff’s enti-
tlement as against defendant in order to determine whether defend-
ant has completed a wrong against plaintiff. In trespass-based 
torts, the inquiry focuses on whether defendant used something of 
plaintiff’s without plaintiff’s authorization. All of these inquiries 
are fact-sensitive, but the facts are classified through the concepts. 
None of behaving badly, causing loss, or causing loss as a conse-
quence of behaving badly is enough. The factual inquiry follows the 
conceptual sequence.  
 Corrective justice is a principle for courts, rather than either an 
empirical description of a tendency in their decisions or a normative 
principle that they should implement which makes no essential ref-
erence to their operations. The principle of corrective justice directs a 
court to resolve a private dispute entirely in terms of what transpired 
between the parties and provides the relevant concepts with which to 
characterize the transaction. It does not, apart from the decision or 
anticipated decision of a court, tell the parties how to resolve their 
 27.  For example, in the tort of nuisance, the locality rule functions as the analogue of 
the standard of care, and physical proximity stands in for the duty question. In cases of 
negligent misrepresentation, the question of the person to whom a representation was 
made goes in the “duty” slot, the question of the transaction with respect to which the rep-
resentation was made into the “remoteness” slot, plaintiff’s reliance into the “causation” 
slot, and standard accounting practice into the “standard of care” slot. 
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dispute. Nor does it impose a moral duty of repair of which a court’s 
task is to remind the parties. Absent a demand by the plaintiff, as 
affirmed by the court, there is no such duty. The parties are free to 
resolve their dispute as they see fit, because it is a dispute about 
their rights as against each other, and each of them is entitled to ex-
ercise those rights as he or she sees fit. A court resolving a dispute in 
terms of corrective justice looks only to the transaction that is the 
subject of the dispute and so reasons in a specific way. 
 A form of reasoning is much more abstract than any of its instanc-
es, and to say that courts characteristically engage in a form of rea-
soning is not to make an empirical generalization which is subject to 
refutation by any counterexample or even to offer a hypothesis that 
holds true most of the time. Instead, it is more like the concept of an 
argument, understood as a series of claims that support a given con-
clusion. The basic way of thinking about argumentation is to start 
with good arguments, those in which the premises support the con-
clusion. It is perfectly consistent with this way of thinking about 
what an argument is to acknowledge that people sometimes, perhaps 
often, or even usually make bad arguments, that is, ones in which the 
premises do not support the conclusion. A bad argument is defective 
as an argument because of its failure to conform to the standards rel-
evant to giving grounds for a conclusion. It is also possible to concede 
further that on occasion people try to get other people to believe 
things without so much as trying to provide a rational basis, through 
a variety of means.  
 Private right, as I have characterized it so far, is an abstract mode 
of argumentation about the rights that purposive beings have against 
each other. Such an account is consistent with conceding that courts 
do not always consistently follow it. In such cases, the court’s reason-
ing is defective because it fails to conform to the standards relevant 
to resolving a dispute between two persons solely in terms of what 
transpired between them. Factors independent of the transaction are 
irrelevant. Because the concepts of private right are abstract, partic-
ular doctrines and decisions need to be interpreted in terms of them, 
so that, for example, if some torts appear to involve nothing more 
than a “pay as you go” rule for engaging in dangerous activities, the 
corrective justice approach recommends examining them and seeing 
whether, in fact, they involve wrongs after all rather than concluding 
too quickly that they are marginal or even outside tort law.28 For rea-
sons to be explained in Part III, its abstract structure shows how issues 
must be framed without always resolving them. Further, because it is 
a form of reasoning, the corrective justice approach provides the re-
 28.  Contra Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 3, at 951-52 (characterizing Rylands v. 
Fletcher, (1868) 3 L.R.E. & I. App. 330 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.)). 
2011]  SEPARATION OF WRONGS AND REMEDIES 177
sources for distinguishing between correct and incorrect instances of 
it. It can characterize at least some apparent counterexamples as 
misapplications of its requirements. For example, if a court engages 
in explicitly non-relational reasoning, whether utilitarian or punitive, 
or in talk about duty or proximate cause as “control devices” or anal-
ysis of pure economic loss in terms of “floodgates,” it may be that the 
best characterization of what it is doing is as a defective instance of 
resolving a dispute about a relational wrong. The point here is not 
that corrective justice must be saved in the face of recalcitrant data, 
but rather that the claim that tort law embodies a principle of correc-
tive justice is an analysis of a mode of reasoning. As such its analyti-
cally basic case is its successful operation. If it never operated suc-
cessfully, there could be no grounds for analyzing tort law in terms of 
it. But its normative structure allows departures from it to be identi-
fied as misapplications of a set of integrated concepts.  
II. WRONGS AND THEIR REPAIR
 My characterization of private right so far has been exclusively in 
terms of rights and duties; I have said little, as yet, about wrongdo-
ing and nothing about its repair, except whatever might be implicit 
in the characterization of the relevant duties, that is, that someone 
who breaches a duty owed to another wrongs that other. My purpose 
in this Section is to further explicate what is implicit in the charac-
terization of the relevant duties, so as to provide an account of 
wrongs and their remedies. Because remedies are remedial, the 
availability and justification of a remedy must always depend upon 
the antecedent existence of a right; because rights must form a con-
sistent set, the specification of the underlying rights can be complet-
ed without any reference to any wrong actually occurring. 
 From the standpoint of private right, a wrong is simply an interfer-
ence with means to which plaintiff has a right. As the example of harm-
less trespasses shows, a wrong need not involve any loss. Conversely, 
as the “no duty” cases show, a loss need not involve a wrong, even if 
it is brought about through defendant’s misconduct towards others. 
 When a wrong occurs, however, the same set of concepts that gen-
erated the underlying rights and correlative duties also generates an 
account of remedies. Put in the barest conceptual terms, the idea is 
simple: if someone interferes with a right that you have, the right 
does not thereby cease to exist. Since your right is to the exclusive 
use and security of your means, you remain entitled to the security of 
your means, even if another interferes with those means and so with 
your right. A remedy serves to “preserve what is mine undimin-
ished.”29 The most transparent example of this structure is in the tort 
 29.  KANT, supra note 20, Ak. 6:271, at 91. 
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of conversion. If I convert your property, perhaps by taking your 
raincoat instead of my own, it does not cease to be your raincoat as a 
result of my wrong against you. The reason that you have a right to 
reclaim it30 is that it is still your coat. But the fact that the coat, qua
physical object, exists through both the wrong and its remedy is not 
essential to the conceptual structure that is at issue. The persistence 
of the coat is inessential; the persistence of the right is essential. To 
say that the right persists is to say that the constraint on my conduct 
does: I am not allowed to act in a way that is inconsistent with your 
claim to the coat. 
 The coat which is the object of the right in this example is, like all 
natural objects, subject to generation and decay, and your right to it 
is not a right to its persistence or even your continued possession of 
it; it is a right that others not use the coat or damage or destroy it in 
certain ways. If I take your coat, I violate that right, but my wrongful 
act does not change the right. The sense in which the right persists is 
just that the fact that it is yours was a constraint on my action, a 
constraint which I violated (whether knowingly or otherwise). It 
would be no constraint on my action if I could abolish it simply by 
acting contrary to it; you would have no right to your coat, as against 
me, if I could extinguish any such right simply by acting contrary to 
it. So it remains your coat after I take it; I must give it back because I 
was not supposed to take it. 
 The same structure applies in cases of so-called “make whole” 
damages in a negligence action, which give you back the equivalent 
of thing that you lost. If I negligently destroy your coat, the coat no 
longer exists. But your right to your coat—that is, the constraint on 
my conduct generated by the fact that you, rather than I, are the one 
who is entitled to determine how it will be used—is not changed by 
the fact that I acted contrary to that right. Destroying the coat does 
not extinguish the right understood as a constraint on my conduct. If 
the coat no longer exists, that constraint may call for different specif-
ic actions. My duty to repair, to restore to you the means to which 
you have a right against me, takes the form of a duty to replace the 
means of which I have deprived you. The duty to replace those means 
comprehends plaintiff’s entitlement to both possession and use of 
what she had. Not only must the coat be restored to your possession, 
but, also, if as a result of the destruction of your coat I deprive you of 
the particular use of it, I must also restore that to which you had a 
right, namely the use of the coat. Your entitlement to damages for 
the loss of use follows from the fact that the thing of which I deprived 
you—in this example, your coat—was yours to use, that is, that you 
 30.  Or in English law, where there is no right to replevin or vindicatio, a right to 
damages in conversion. 
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have it as a means with which to set and pursue purposes as you see 
fit. You did not have a right to it because it was useful. Instead, it is 
useful to you because you have a right to it; it is your means, and so 
you alone have a right to its usefulness.31 If it were not yours, then, 
no matter how useful, indeed necessary, to you it might have been, 
you have no right to its usefulness—which is just the direct implica-
tion of the distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance as it 
figures in the “no duty” cases.32
III.   PRIVATE RIGHT AND POSITIVE LAW
 The account I have given of the broad structure of tort law as a 
doctrine of means, whereby it protects each person’s means against 
both use by others and certain side effects of other people’s use of 
their means and remedies any wrongs by restoring means or their 
equivalent, is, to say the least, highly abstract. Indeed, it might seem 
to be so abstract as to be incapable of deciding any cases. I now want 
to suggest, however, first, that its abstractness is a fundamental vir-
tue and, second of all, that it requires institutional expression in or-
der to decide most cases. I say “most” because the fundamental dis-
tinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance is already sufficient to 
identify a class of cases in which plaintiff simply fails to state a cause 
of action. If plaintiff alleges that he suffered a loss as a result of de-
fendant’s breach of a contract with a third party, plaintiff fails to 
state a cause of action; the same result obtains if plaintiff’s allegation 
concerns a tort against a third party. So, too, if plaintiff concedes that 
there was no apparent connection between defendant’s activity and 
the prospect of injuring her. Such an unforeseeable plaintiff is con-
ceptually incapable of claiming that defendant should have taken ac-
count of her safety; as unforeseeable, she is thereby in the class of 
persons of whom no account can be taken. So, too, if plaintiff’s allega-
tion is that defendant fails to take the minimal steps that a minimal-
ly decent human being would take to accommodate her needs or aid 
her in her efforts, she necessarily fails to state a cause of action. The-
 31.  On the use and usefulness of the object of a right to what is yours as the basis of 
consequential damages, see Peter Benson, Contract as a Transfer of Ownership, 48 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1673, 1727 (2007). 
 32.  Goldberg and Zipursky object to corrective justice on the grounds that it should 
lead exclusively to “make-whole” damages, and so is unable to explain consequential dam-
ages, which they refer to by the unfortunate and misleading name of “parasitic damages.” 
Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 3, at 963. The latter term is usually taken to describe 
damages that are not consequential on a wrong but which plaintiff recovers anyway as a 
result of having suffered a different wrong. See Lord Denning’s disparaging remarks about 
parasitic damages in Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd. v. Martin & Co., [1973] 1 Q.B. 27, 28. My 
colleague Ernest Weinrib has a more detailed discussion of consequential damages in his 
contribution to this Symposium, which I wholly endorse; my comments above are meant 
only to indicate the abstract structure that is at issue. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Civil Re-
course and Corrective Justice, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 273 (2011). 
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se cases are not trivial, and they provide an interesting analytical 
structure for a first-year torts course. However, most cases require 
more; indeed, more is required even in most cases in which plaintiff 
ultimately fails to state a cause of action. The more that is required is 
institutions and the development of legal doctrine.  
It is a familiar feature of practical thought, both in the law and 
elsewhere, that abstract concepts figure in the appropriate formula-
tion of the fundamental moral ideas, while, at the same time, those 
concepts can mostly just be related to each other and are difficult or 
impossible to explicate in some other, seemingly more neutral vocab-
ulary. Nor is this feature restricted to practical thought. The difficul-
ties of explaining something as simple as counting without recourse 
to such mathematical concepts as succession are well known in the 
philosophical literature.33 But the issue is particularly clear in practi-
cal contexts. Indeed, the issue provides at least part of the impetus 
for both legal realism and the economic analysis of law, both of which 
insist that ordinary legal thought is one or more of capacious, inde-
terminate, conclusory, or circular on the grounds that it cannot be 
explicated in terms of social policy or economic efficiency. What eco-
nomic analysis and legal realism regard as vices are, in fact, the vir-
tues of practical thought, and the ambition of a conceptual account of 
an area of practical thought is precisely that it displays the relevant 
form of reasoning. Lack of determinacy would be a deficiency of the 
form of reasoning in which courts engage in resolving private dis-
putes if it could only be vindicated by being reduced to some other 
form of reasoning.34
 But if the realist and economic critique of ordinary legal concepts 
fails to show that those concepts are illicit, it is nonetheless correct to 
point to the partial indeterminacy of abstract categories and their 
inability to resolve many concrete disputes. The realist’s imaginary 
opponent who purports to resolve every legal case merely by deduc-
tion from concepts is, indeed, impossible. The realist’s mistake is in 
concluding from this that concepts are irrelevant. Still, relevant 
 33.  LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 56-57 (G.E.M. Anscombe 
trans., 1953); see also Martin Stone, The Significance of Doing and Suffering, in PHILOSO-
PHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 131 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001).
 34.  In saying this I don’t mean to suggest that there is no question about whether, all 
things considered, one ought to reason in this way, although I would insist that the ques-
tion of which things need to be considered can only be addressed within a specific form of 
reasoning; the importance of various ends, both in general and for particular agents, indi-
vidual or collective, who are charged with making decisions, only emerges within a particu-
lar appropriate form of reasoning. So any question about the “all things considered” appro-
priateness of the tort system would need to be located within a broader political philosophy 
charged with examining the legitimate bases of the exercise of state power and the relation 
between the two forms of dominium distinguished in the Middle Ages, proprietas and iu-
risdictio, private law and public law. An “all things considered” question is not, simply as 
such, a question about the overall balance of good and bad consequences.  
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though they are, insofar as they figure in such claims as that a cer-
tain level of noise is excessive or that defendant failed to exercise 
reasonable care towards plaintiff, they need to be made more deter-
minate. Otherwise, they would turn out to be “weasel words”35
through which disputants seek to advance positions on which the 
concepts are silent, and decisionmakers leave themselves the room to 
make whatever decisions seem right in their own eyes.  
 Not every abstract form of reasoning that is potentially indeter-
minate in its application requires institutional expression, but the set 
of concepts organizing private right plainly do. Private right charac-
terizes the conceptual structure in which each person’s entitlement to 
use his or her own means is constrained by a like entitlement on the 
part of others. That is, the requirements are systematic. Further, if 
everyone has the same type of entitlements, the requirements are 
also objective in the familiar legal sense of that term. The unusually 
sensitive plaintiff gets no solace from the law. Nor does the incompe-
tent who tries his best get treated differently than others. Instead, 
the law purports to hold everyone to the same standards on the 
grounds that everyone has the same formal right to the security of 
what he or she already has.  
 These twin demands of systematicity and objectivity entail that 
the conceptual structure of private right can only be made to apply to 
particulars if it is applied in the same way for everyone; otherwise, it 
is inadequate to its own internal structure. That doesn’t mean that 
you could not try your best to act in accordance with right in the ab-
sence of legal institutions. But, it does mean that an authoritative 
determination is required in order to give effect to right. Right gov-
erns relations between private persons, and the answer, with respect 
to any dispute between any pair of persons, must be the same for 
both of those persons with respect to that dispute. So the austere 
structure must be made more determinate, characterizing uses as 
ordinary, demarcating the classes of persons of who account must be 
taken when engaged in various activities, and deciding what counts 
as being careful enough. Far from overlooking the fact that tort law is 
a human institution, the rights-based account explains why the rele-
vant conceptual order can only be realized in a human institution 
that supposes itself to be entitled to resolve disputes and impose its 
resolutions on the parties. 
 The rights-based account also focuses on another respect in which 
abstract concepts of right need to be made institutional: it is only by 
being made both systematic and enforceable that private rights com-
prise a system in which everyone’s means are protected. Although 
 35.  Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, 
Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 96 n.39 (1975). 
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the broad structure of corrective justice can be characterized in ab-
straction from institutions, it cannot be given effect except through 
them. General legal rules must issue from an authoritative source; 
particular orders authorize compulsion in light of the law.36
 In keeping with the official topic of the Symposium, I now want to 
focus on the question of whether, as a conceptual account, the charac-
terization of corrective justice I have offered is adequate to the law of 
tort that Goldberg and Zipursky seek to explain. The question of how 
to determine whether an abstract account is adequate to something 
encountered in experience—whether characterized in terms of con-
firmation, verification, or application—is not, on its own, a conceptu-
al matter. However, it needs to be addressed in a way that is con-
sistent with the conceptual nature of the inquiry. Even though the 
concepts do not apply themselves, I want to suggest that, just as 
they require institutional expression in order to give determinate an-
swers, so, too, they require a specific kind of institutional expression. 
The concepts are abstract, but contentful, rather than being concrete 
and exceptionless. 
IV.   THE INCORPORATION STRATEGY AND                                               
GOLDBERG AND ZIPURSKY’S OBJECTIONS
 With this in mind, I now want to return to the four objections. Re-
call that these were, in order, that corrective justice cannot account 
for the diversity of wrongs, that it is unable to comprehend the broad 
spectrum of very different remedies, that it fails to explain why a tort 
suit takes place at plaintiff’s initiative and involves not a right to a 
remedy or duty to repair but rather a power on the part of the plain-
tiff to exact a remedy, and, finally, that the corrective justice account 
is entirely at odds with the social nature of tort law and the ways in 
which it considers standards of ordinariness.
 Each of the objections can be read as an instance of a broader 
strategy running through Goldberg and Zipursky’s writing, a strate-
gy of characterizing legal doctrine as the incorporation and formali-
zation of social norms that are antecedent to it and contingently tak-
en up by it, based on general assessments of weight or significance. 
This strategy is in turn infused with a contrast between the ordinar-
iness of tort law and high abstractions about risk and rights. I am not 
sure of the depth of their commitment to this strategy; in developing 
other aspects of their view, they do not seem to rely on it. Each of the 
objections is formulated in terms of it. I take no stand here on wheth-
er these are incautious overstatements or are instead implications of 
their rejection of views that are too “metaphysical.” I hope they are 
the former, for I will endeavor to show that the incorporation strate-
 36.  I explain this in more detail in Force and Freedom, RIPSTEIN, supra note 20.  
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gy in indefensible and that, stripped of it, civil recourse theory is in-
distinguishable from corrective justice.  
 The strategy is particularly clear in the case of the fourth objec-
tion, which is explicitly concerned with the way in which the empiri-
cal figures in tort law. Zipursky advocates a “civil competency” analy-
sis of the reasonable person standard in the law of negligence.37 After 
correctly pointing out that the Learned Hand test, much beloved of 
law professors, though disliked by courts and abhorred by juries, fails 
to connect in any meaningful way with the practice of courts, 
Zipursky goes on to offer an alternative, focused on what an ordinary 
person would do.38 He approvingly quotes from Baron Alderson’s 
speech in Blyth v. Birmingham: “Negligence is the omission to do 
something which a reasonable man, guided upon those considera-
tions which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would 
do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would 
not do.”39 Zipursky takes this to show that the reasonable person 
doesn’t figure as an abstraction, but rather as a kind of concrete par-
ticular. The law is filled with wording like this. Most famously, as 
stated in Lord Atkin’s celebrated speech in Donoghue v. Stevenson, “I 
do not think so ill of our jurisprudence as to suppose that its princi-
ples are so remote from the ordinary needs of civilized society and the 
ordinary claims it makes upon its members as to deny a legal remedy 
where there is so obviously a social wrong.”40 The same framing of the 
issue is addressed to the question of standard of care in Lord Reid’s 
speech in Bolton v. Stone: “It would take a good deal to make me be-
lieve that the law has departed so far from the standards which guide 
ordinary careful people in ordinary life.”41 This appeal to the ordi-
nary—the claim civilized society makes on its members and the 
standards that guide ordinary people—is, according to Zipursky’s ac-
count, evidence that the standard of care is concerned with ordinari-
ness, rather than with risk. In the tort of negligence, “unreasonable” 
does not mean “too dangerous” but something closer to “substand-
ard.” As he puts it, “Undoubtedly, a waiter’s careless dropping of a 
plate is sometimes the product of unreasonable risk-taking, but there 
is no reason to believe it always is. There is no reason to believe that 
whenever someone injures another through careless conduct, like 
dropping a plate, it is the result of an unreasonable risk having been 
taken. If I trip walking down the sidewalk, or if I aspirate my Diet 
Coke somewhat and choke, these misperformances of mine are not 
 37.  See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Sleight of Hand, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1999, 
2033-41 (2007). 
 38.  See id. at 2013-22, 2033-41. 
 39.  Id. at 2017 (quoting Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., (1856) 156 Eng. Rep. 
1047 (Exch. Div.) 1049; 11 Ex. 780, 784).   
 40.  Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.) at 583 (appeal taken from Scot.). 
 41.  Bolton v. Stone, [1951] A.C. 850 (H.L.) 867 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
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necessarily products of risk-taking. The waiter’s dropping the soup is 
no different.”42 The choice of examples makes it clear that the care-
less person is identified in terms of typical competence and without 
any reference to the rights of others.  
 The same strategy figures in their characterization of duties. Alt-
hough they accept the rights-based account of duties as essentially 
and irreducibly relational, they sometimes represent the duties that 
the law incorporates as legally significant only because they happen 
to have been so incorporated. Thus, as I understand their framing of 
the issue, a plethora of relational social duties are informally en-
forced in our society.43 The law chooses some of these and turns them 
into binding legal duties. This is why the duties in question unsur-
prisingly form a hodgepodge; each of the duties is what it is apart 
from incorporation into the law of tort and survives as a member of 
the law of tort because of the official acts of recognition which instill 
legal status upon it: “[W]hen a judge makes clear that she is talking 
about legal duties when she is deciding a case, not moral duties, she 
is indicating that she is identifying obligations within an institution-
ally entrenched web.”44 It is not that institutions entrench a web of 
concepts by relating them to particulars; instead, the claim appears 
to be that the fact of institutional entrenchment makes disparate 
norms into a web.  
 The strategy figures yet again in the account of recourse: “Instead, 
it is to appreciate that tort is a civilized alternative to vengeance—
civil recourse for the plaintiff, which is appropriately channeled 
through and cabined by law.”45 There are social motivations that lead 
people to become angry or worse when they believe themselves to 
have been wronged. The plaintiff “feels aggrieved or injured”46 and 
the tort system channels these impulses, bringing procedure to bear 
on the anger. If this substitution of process for feeling is to succeed, 
the court must award remedies on the basis of something other than 
restoring that of which the aggrieved plaintiff was deprived. 
 The same incorporation strategy figures, finally, in the account of 
remedies, which are presented as social norms the significance of 
which does not depend on their relation to the rights the violation of 
which they are supposed to remedy. Immediately after characterizing 
tort as a law of recourse rather than right, Goldberg and Zipursky 
explain how this ineluctably leads to the diversity of remedies:  
But it is also to appreciate and accept that successful tort plaintiffs 
will sometimes be entitled to something more than “justice” de-
 42.  Zipursky, supra note 37, at 2018.  
 43.  Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 3, at 937-38. 
 44.  Id. at 953. 
 45.  Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 19, at 1581.  
 46.  Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 3, at 943. 
2011]  SEPARATION OF WRONGS AND REMEDIES 185
mands or even permits, at least if justice is understood as the 
achievement of a just distribution of gains and losses as between 
tortfeasor and victim. Here, the most obvious example is the egg-
shell plaintiff, who may stand to recover a huge amount of com-
pensation from a minimally culpable defendant. It is questionable 
whether justice is being done in such cases, but our tort system au-
thorizes this sort of outcome because tort law is not a scheme for 
restoring a normative equilibrium as between doer and sufferer. It 
is, for better and worse, a law for the redress of private wrongs.47
 I want to suggest, however, that the flaw is not with corrective 
justice but rather with the incorporation strategy and its accompany-
ing picture of the law of tort as a mode of social control, whose func-
tion it is to cabin reactive attitudes by channeling them into the court 
system, thereby both reducing the harmful and entropic effects of 
self-help, through the selection of a canonical set of wrongs that will 
be actionable, and the development of a plurality of remedies cali-
brated to defuse the impulses that make them necessary. Each of the 
objections turns on the incorporation strategy: duties form a hodge-
podge because they have been incorporated based on a sense of seri-
ousness, not violations of rights; remedies have been incorporated 
because judges thought them apt; ordinary care is severed from ideas 
of risk and reintroduced as the idea that ordinary conduct is less ag-
gravating; the requirement that plaintiff alone has standing to en-
force her rights is amputated from the rights being enforced only to 
be reassembled as an aspect of American law that is supposed to be 
both essential and merely empirical.  
 Goldberg and Zipursky sometimes articulate their understanding 
of tort law as a structure of social control in the vocabulary of a 
broadly Lockean social contract theory, according to which the legal 
right to recourse is a form of compensation given to citizens in return 
for their surrender of what might be thought of as an executive right 
of nature.48 As Zipursky first put it, “While the state takes away the 
 47.  Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 19, at 1581. 
 48.  See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages: Fair v. Full Com-
pensation, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 441 (2006) (“Understandably, government generally 
declines to restore that right in the form of a broad, positive-law self-help privilege.”). In a 
footnote to this sentence Goldberg explains what makes this understandable: “Among other 
things, declining to do so discourages continuing cycles of vengeance, protects wrongdoers 
from excessive retaliation, and empowers victims who might otherwise be unable to retali-
ate.” Id. at 441 n.22. See also Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the 
Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 84 (1998) (“It is essential to our ordered society and our 
legal system that we do not permit private retribution for the violation of legal rights. Hav-
ing been wronged is neither an excuse nor a justification for violence against or taking from 
another, except in rare cases. The law prohibits and criminalizes violence as a reaction to 
legal wrongs. That is, indeed, part of what is sometimes meant by ‘the rule of law.’ Never-
theless, the often touted principle, ‘Ubi jus, ubi remedium’—where there’s a right there’s a 
remedy—expresses the widely shared conviction that if one has been wronged, one ought, 
in fairness, to have some recourse through the state against the wrongdoer. In other words, 
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liberty of private retribution, it offers a right to civil redress in its 
place. While it creates in each a vulnerability to action under the law, 
it provides in return protection from the threat of private retribu-
tion.”49 He later wrote, “The natural right to seek redress is conceded 
in return for a right of civil redress, a private right of action.”50 The 
account is broadly Lockean because it does not hew to Locke’s own 
claim that the executive right is a right to enforce rights.51 They un-
derstand it as less of a right and more of an inclination or urge to get 
even with those against whom you suppose yourself to have a griev-
ance. Having prohibited barbaric recourse, the state placates the ag-
grieved by providing civil recourse in its place.  
 In different places Goldberg and Zipursky express varying degrees 
of commitment to this account. Sometimes it seems to undergird 
their entire approach, but other times they mention only the con-
sistency of their view with such an approach. I do not propose to re-
solve the question of the degree of their commitment to it. Instead, I 
will urge that they repudiate it entirely; although it provides a clear 
point of contrast with corrective justice theory, it generates an un-
stable amalgam of conceptual and empirical factors. That amalgam is 
not only inconsistent with corrective justice, but also with the idea of 
relational duties. From the point of view of placating anger, factors 
other than the breach of relational duties may be relevant. For ex-
ample, the motive with which an injurer acted may make a consider-
able difference to how the injured plaintiff feels about the injurer’s 
conduct. Indeed, even if no duty existed, bad motives generate re-
sentment. So the person who callously stands by as another drowns 
invites blame, resentment, and anger, as does the person who per-
forms an otherwise legal act out of malice. From the perspective of 
blame and anger, it is difficult to see why relational duties in particu-
lar would be the focus of such an account, or why the desire to harm 
wouldn’t figure more centrally in it.52
                                                                                                                  
where the state forbids private vengeful retribution, fairness demands that an opportunity 
for redress be provided by the state.”). “Our society thus avoids the mayhem and crudeness 
of vengeful private retribution, but without the unfairness of leaving individuals powerless 
against invasions of their rights.” Id. at 85. 
 49.  Zipursky, supra note 48, at 86. 
 50.  Benjamin C. Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 623, 642 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro, eds., 2002). 
 51.  In Two Conceptions of Tort Damages, Goldberg does talk about “restoring rights,” 
but it is difficult to see how this is consistent with his claim about remedies as distinct 
from the rights the wronging of which they remedy. Goldberg, supra note 48, at 441. 
 52.  The root of the difficulty is not with Goldberg and Zipursky’s focus on what have 
come to be called “reactive attitudes,” such as anger, indignation, and resentment. See, e.g.,
P.F. STRAWSON, FREEDOM AND RESENTMENT AND OTHER ESSAYS (1974); R. JAY WALLACE,
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS (1994). For an account relating these to rela-
tional features of morality, see STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT:
MORALITY, RESPECT, AND ACCOUNTABILITY (2006). There is a significant tradition in juris-
prudence, the central text of which is Adam Smith’s Lectures on Jurisprudence, which 
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 More fundamentally, the Lockean contractarian account admits of 
two interpretations. One possibility is that the claim of right is basic 
and structures the remedy, but “state of nature” recourse is barbaric 
only because of the lack of competent institutions. On this first read-
ing, the conceptually basic case, through which action and reaction 
are understood, is the one where claims of right are decided on 
their merits, rather than through force, and the alternative to barba-
rism is to set up institutions that do corrective justice. 53 Civil re-
course serves to make this possible; parties concerned to protect their 
rights would set up institutions that do justice between them. On the 
second reading, barbarism is the basic case and the idea of rights, 
both as asserted and as assessed on its merits, is derivative, some-
thing that positive law has taken up as a way of domesticating 
grievance.54 This latter account is at odds with a corrective justice 
account because it represents the case in which claims are decided 
through force as conceptually basic. It identifies a good that recourse 
is supposed to serve or promote which makes no reference to the mer-
its of an aggrieved plaintiff’s claim. On this approach, the object of 
the social contract is not the upholding of rights but the satisfaction 
of grievances. 
                                                                                                                  
makes moral sentiments of approval and resentment central, but takes the objects of those 
attitudes to be what Smith calls “Perfect rights,” which he characterizes as “those which we 
have a title to demand and if refused to compel an other to perform.” ADAM SMITH, LEC-
TURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 9 (R.L. Meek et al. eds., 1978). He later identified these with 
rights to security of person and property, the importance of which he traces to the benefits 
of certain patterns of human interactions. Id. at 9-10. On Smith’s account, the reactive 
attitudes are warranted by wrongs, and remedies for wrongdoing are, as a corrective jus-
tice account would suggest, just the enforcement of the rights themselves. Id. at 10. I take 
no stand here on whether Smith’s sentimentalist program for private rights can be com-
pleted successfully. I mention it here only because Goldberg and Zipursky appear to depart 
from it, characterizing civil recourse as a substitute for private revenge that is required to 
placate unruly sentiments, organized by a set of norms distinct from those that organize 
the wrongs. 
 53.  Adam Smith’s Lectures on Jurisprudence provides a sentimentalist version of this 
first approach:  
For 1st., the resentment of the offended person leads him to correct the offend-
er, as to make him <?feel> by whom and for what he suffers. Resentment is 
never compleatly, nor as we think nobly gratified by poison or assassination. 
This has in all nations and at all times been held as unmanly, because the suf-
ferer does not by this means feel from whom, or for what, the punishment is in-
flicted.—2dly, the punishment which resentment dictates we should inflict on 
the offender tends sufficiently to deter either him or any other from injuring us 
or any other person in that manner. 3dly, resentment also leads a man to seek 
redress or compensation for the injury he has received.  
SMITH, supra note 52, at 105. For Smith, private revenge is a crude version of the legal 
requirements of punishment and compensation, not the basic case which they replace. 
 54.  Compare this with James Fitzjames Stephen’s often quoted claims that “[t]he 
criminal law stands to the passion of revenge in much the same relation as marriage to the 
sexual appetite.” JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF 
ENGLAND 99 (1863). 
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 The ambiguity between these two approaches permeates the social 
contract argument in another way as well. The contention that the 
state deprives citizens of a natural right of redress and so must give 
them a right of civil recourse in its place can either be interpreted as 
an application of the corrective justice ideas it is meant to replace, 
focused on the need for a party who deprives another of something to 
which the other has a right to provide an equivalent, or in terms of 
the need to provide an alternative to private revenge in order to pla-
cate unruly passions. 
 The second approach would require the incorporation strategy and 
may well provide its underlying motivation. It would explain each of 
the four contrasts with corrective justice that Goldberg and Zipursky 
assert. A grievance-based account would focus on the fact that social 
norms have been taken up, regarding the principle of their selection 
as a “for better or worse” feature of positive law. It would note that 
remedies are selected on the basis of something other than the organ-
izing ideas of private right. It would allow the ordinariness of de-
fendant’s conduct to screen out grievances, refusing to empower peo-
ple who complain about ordinary behavior on the part of others, and 
would thematize plaintiff’s power to proceed against defendant as 
having its basis in the generic fact that plaintiff was legally wronged, 
rather than in the specific right of plaintiff that was violated.  
 I will work my way through each of the instances of the incorpora-
tion strategy in turn.  
A.   The Standard of Care 
 Consider, first, the standard of care. Although it is not obvious 
how anyone, whether social scientist or court, could be in a position 
to satisfy themselves on this question, I am prepared to concede that 
people are more likely to “feel aggrieved or injured” if they are in-
jured through the conduct of others that falls below the “standards 
which guide ordinary careful people in ordinary life.” But that is not 
enough to provide any support for Zipursky’s bolder contention that 
the standard of care is not concerned with risk-taking at all. Much 
depends on what, precisely, is meant by “risk-taking.”55 If it is taken 
to mean, as an economic interpretation of the Learned Hand test 
proposes, the calculated decision to take a risk, then certainly ques-
tions about ordinary care and the standards that guide careful people 
have no bearing on whether defendant decided unwisely with respect 
to a particular risk. So Zipursky’s argument is successful against the 
economic interpretation of the Learned Hand test. The conventional-
ist account he proposes in its place is less successful. Although there 
may be waiters who make a calculated decision to carry too many 
 55.  Zipursky, supra note 37, at 2018. 
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bowls of soup at one time, the clumsy waiter who spills breaches the 
standard of care regardless of what, if anything, he was thinking 
about. But the correct conclusion to be drawn from this is not that 
carrying soup clumsily is defective because most people don’t do it or 
even because most careful people don’t do it. Instead, the correct con-
clusion to draw is that carrying soup clumsily is defective because it 
might spill on someone. The modal idea that it might spill is, of 
course, just the idea of risk; the modifier “on someone” is the relational 
idea of risk to someone in particular. The restaurateur who tells the 
waiter to be careful need not have made an explicit calculation in or-
der to conclude that it is too risky, but the sense in which it is too 
risky is just the prospect of the waiter spilling soup on someone.56
 Breach of a relational duty is not so much as engaged by talking 
about the sort of clumsiness or incompetence in aspirating my drink. 
Clumsiness is a non-relational feature of me, which can be made re-
lational in either of two ways. First, someone could treat it as com-
paratively relational, remarking that Arthur is clumsier than Ben. 
Second, one could make it non-comparatively relational by consider-
ing whether Arthur was clumsy towards Ben. The former might be 
relevant to a comparative inquiry (including the sort of inquiry in 
which that Goldberg and Zipursky contend loss allocation engage) 
but doesn’t go to any claim plaintiff might have. Again, although 
plaintiff’s anger or some other feeling, and so her impulse towards 
retaliation, might be piqued by defendant’s clumsiness, any such im-
pulse has no legal place except in relation to a wrong. The only way 
defendant’s competence or its lack is relevant to plaintiff is if it is 
competence or otherwise in relation to her; is it the kind of thing that 
characteristically jeopardizes her right? But that is just the question 
of risk; as Cardozo remarks in the Palsgraf case, risk is a term of re-
lation.57 Neither “clumsy” nor “incompetent” is. That is why an un-
foreseeable plaintiff’s attitude towards the platform guard whose 
clumsiness caused her injury is of no significance.  
 If, in order to be relevant to the breach of a relational duty, ordi-
nariness must itself be analyzed in relational terms, then the idea of 
ordinariness cannot, without more, be used to cast any doubt on the 
corrective justice approach. In order to make it into a genuine com-
 56.  Stumbling or aspirating aerated beverages are misleading examples in another 
respect. Each characterizes a result, rather than the manner in which the result came 
about. Someone can fall or gag without any incompetence. The same point applies to care-
ful waiters who sometimes spill soup. With respect to spilled soup, finders of fact might 
take themselves to have enough general knowledge about the world to conclude that the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies in such cases, and so take the fact that the soup spilled 
on plaintiff as strong circumstantial evidence that the waiter was careless towards plain-
tiff. But even in those cases, the circumstantial evidence suggests that conduct was too 
dangerous in the sense of being too likely to go wrong.  
 57.  Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928). 
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parison, we would have to determine how, based on the corrective 
justice approach, the requirement that people avoid excessive danger 
to others, or excessive interference with their neighbors more gener-
ally, could be made determinate and given effect by a finder of fact 
charged with determining, in relation to a concrete dispute, whether 
defendant had been careful enough. And here, it seems, the correc-
tive justice account has a straightforward answer.  
 Aristotle was the first to write of corrective justice, and his formu-
lation of the most general form any such answer might take still 
commends itself. Aristotle remarks that there are fundamental limits 
to any purely theoretical analysis in determining what virtue re-
quires in a concrete situation.58 He is not suggesting that virtue ad-
mits of no theoretical analysis, only that, if you are trying to make 
yourself virtuous, the thing to do is stop reflecting and, turning on 
your own good judgment, try and pick a phronimos, an exemplar to 
copy, to make yourself more like one.59 Aristotle’s discussion of cor-
rective justice is included in his catalogue of the virtues and the same 
thought applies to it. If you want to know what it is to be careful—
given that, at the most abstract level, being careful is just a matter of 
limiting the foreseeable side effects of your conduct to the level that 
is the inevitable concomitant of pursuing your purposes in a public 
world in which others do the same—you ask what ordinary careful 
people do. The ordinary careful person serves as an exemplar, with-
out being an ideal of complete virtue; as exemplar, the ordinary care-
ful person shows what actual people can achieve and so sets an 
achievable norm.60 Any such characterization runs the risk of circu-
larity, but it is difficult to see why this would be objectionable61 since 
the task is to instruct the finder of fact as to how to frame the issue, 
how to think about whether defendant was being careful enough on 
this occasion. That is why Lord Reid’s discussion of the standard of 
care in Bolton v. Stone consists largely of platitudes—if the risk is 
fantastic and far-fetched, you may ignore it, if it is “infinitesimal” 
then you may normally ignore it, but if the risk is real you just have 
to stop what you are doing, even if that means that “if cricket cannot 
 58.  See generally ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. VI (Lesley Brown ed., 
David Ross trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2009) (c. 384 B.C.E.). 
 59.  See id. 
 60.  As Smith points out, the careful and prudent person may warrant only a certain 
“cold” esteem rather than the full admiration of the fully virtuous person. ADAM SMITH,
THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 253 (Knud Haakonssen ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 
2002) (1759). 
 61.  Unless it is assumed, as some advocates of economic analysis wish to, but Gold-
berg and Zipursky do not, that all tort concepts must be reducible to concepts expressible 
without remainder in some other vocabulary. On the nature of circularity in common law 
reasoning, see Martin Stone, Legal Positivism as an Idea about Morality, 61 U. TORONTO
L.J. 313, 314 (2011).  
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be played safely on a ground, it should not be played at all.”62 His fur-
ther gloss, in Wagon Mound II, adds a further near-platitude: you are 
not allowed to ignore infinitesimal risks imposed by your conduct if 
you could go about your own purposes in a way that is just the same 
from your point of view and makes it significantly safer for somebody 
else.63 The platitudes remain helpful because they all concern something 
that ordinary people already know how to do. The thing they know 
how to do is not how to be ordinary, but rather how to be careful. Pri-
vate right gives a characterization of what it is to be careful and why 
carefulness raises issues of justice. It doesn’t give instructions on how 
to be careful. It tells you what is at stake, how to frame the question, 
and how to think about it, not what to think about it. But once you 
know how to think about it, the obvious thing to do is to consider the 
familiar examples, both as particulars and as abstract archetypes.  
B.   Duty 
 Goldberg and Zipursky suggest that the task of the law is to pick 
up on preexisting social duties. They draw attention to the “plurality” 
of fundamentally different interests protected by tort liability.64
Goldberg is explicit about the role of law in recognizing particular 
interests as worthy of protection and vindication: 
Specifically, it is used to refer to a set of individual interests that 
the law recognizes as worthy of protection and vindication. For ex-
ample, even though interference with one’s interest in being free 
from annoyance—or in having aesthetically pleasing surround-
ings—might fairly be treated as a setback or harm to the victim, 
neither is treated by tort law as a sufficiently weighty interest to 
warrant recognition of duties on the part of others to refrain from 
or avoid interfering with that interest. If D acts carelessly with re-
gard to P’s interest in not being annoyed so as proximately to 
cause P annoyance, P has no tort cause of action against D because 
the law of negligence does not regard the suffering of annoyance as 
the sort of harm that rises to the level of an injury, even though 
the annoyance is a loss or harm suffered by P.65
The vocabulary of interests and the idea that they enter the law on 
the basis of factors external to ideas of wrongdoing is developed fur-
ther in Torts as Wrongs:
 62.  Bolton v. Stone, [1951] A.C. 850 (H.L.) 867 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 63.  See Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v. Miller Steamship Co. (Wagon Mound II), 
[1967] 1 A.C. 617 (H.L.).   
 64.  Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 3, at 941. 
 65.  Goldberg, supra note 48, at 440 n.16; see also JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN 
C. ZIPURSKY, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: TORTS 27-45 (2010) (discussing 
tort law’s “gallery of wrongs”).
192 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol 39:163
Tortious wrongdoing always involves an interference with one of a 
set of individual interests that are significant enough aspects of a 
person’s well-being to warrant the imposition of a duty on others 
not to interfere with the interest in certain ways, notwithstanding 
the liberty restriction inherent in such a duty imposition. In part out 
of a sense of the limitations as to what sorts of interferences and 
injuries are justiciable, and in part for policy considerations that 
have changed over time with changes in social norms and economic 
and political circumstances, courts and legislatures have never 
sought to render interferences with all such interests actionable.66
 I want to suggest, however, that focusing on interests protected 
and social norms distracts from the structure of reasoning in which 
the putatively diverse interests figure and that the norms express. 
Social norms figure in the determination of abstract concepts of right, 
and interests only matter if they can be brought under the concept of 
right. That means, at a minimum, that neither non-relational judg-
ments about well-being nor comparative assessments of whether in-
terests are “weighty” are the starting points for analysis. In giving 
effect to corrective justice, the positive law must, as Lord Atkin sug-
gests, pay close attention to what is a social wrong. But it does so by 
already presupposing the concept of a wrong and so of what it is for 
one person to wrong another, as one person’s violation of another’s 
right. And here, the question of duty is not a matter of social norms 
at all, but rather a question of each person’s right to the security of 
his or her person, property, and reputation. Freedom from annoyance 
is not insufficiently “weighty” as an “interest”; although it may have 
a significant impact on “well-being,” it is the wrong sort of thing to be 
the object of a right. Because the “duty” question is antecedent to the 
question of standard of care (even though each concerns a different 
aspect of the same risk), it does not focus on how careful defendant 
needs to be but only on whether this sort of defendant, engaged in 
this activity, needs to be careful for the sake of this aspect of plain-
tiff’s right. That question cannot be answered in terms of an interest 
that is characterized without reference to a right because interests 
are not constraints on the conduct of others.  
 Goldberg’s choice of annoyance as an example67 masks the signifi-
cance of these structural features of duty by introducing an interest 
that his readers are likely to regard as trivial and leaving out any 
characterization of how the annoyance comes about. His example of 
aesthetic surroundings68 is misleading in another way, as it looks like 
a busybody interest in restricting what others do with their own 
property and so is relational in the wrong direction. But neither of 
66. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 3, at 937.  
 67.  See Goldberg, supra note 48, at 440 n.16. 
 68.  See id. 
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these captures what is distinctive about relational rights, and so the 
fact that the interests at issue will not be “weighty” enough is overde-
termined. Both are cases in which no possible right is at issue and so 
provide no support for the contention that whether the law finds a 
right and correlative duty depends upon how weighty an interest is. 
 In order for institutions to make the requirement of looking out for 
the rights of others concrete, however, they inevitably engage in a 
task of judgment and classification: Is this case like that one or more 
like the other one? In asking such questions, courts are best under-
stood as giving effect to the abstract requirements of right. In devel-
oping the law, the place of judgment is ineliminable. From this it fol-
lows that a contextual and incremental approach is likely to recom-
mend itself. The point is not that this is the only logically possible 
way of making abstract relational norms concrete, but rather that it 
is one possible way, and the most obvious, and the most consonant 
with general concerns about the rule of law, which demand that citi-
zens be in a position to have at least a general idea of what the law 
demands of them. The ways in which ordinary careful people think 
about the demands of social life are not the last word, but they can be 
taken to be instantiations of the general categories of right, and ordi-
nary people can be in a position to assess their own conduct and that 
of others. 
 The advice to proceed with good judgment, contextually and in-
crementally, is itself like Aristotle’s advice about finding yourself a 
phronimos. It tells you why you need one but doesn’t tell you what to do. 
It just tells you how to think about it. But given that the purpose is to 
create a system in which each is entitled to use his or her own means, 
restricted only by the entitlement of others to do the same, there is 
no other place to look for guidance except in the way in which people 
living consistently with the entitlements of others order their lives.  
 At the same time, no amount of contextualization or good judg-
ment can provide a basis for rejecting private right’s signature dis-
tinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance. The incorporation 
strategy has difficulty explaining why this should be so. In certain 
contexts, there are social norms prohibiting aggressively competitive 
behavior, and in others there are norms demanding that people con-
tribute to the individual and collective well-being of others. In still 
other contexts, social norms strongly discourage people from standing 
on their rights. Were any of these norms not generally observed, so-
cial life would be much harsher than it is. At least some of these 
norms are relational, and at least some of those create a sense of 
grievance in those who are denied the benefits that compliance with 
them would provide. By focusing on the incorporation of preexisting 
social norms, rather than regarding the norms the law does take up 
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as instantiations of basic structures of rightful interaction,69 Goldberg 
and Zipursky represent the law’s failure to take up norms of mutual 
aid or generosity as sociologically and legally accidental, at least in 
cases in which the interests at stake are no less weighty. As such, 
they risk representing the law’s insistence on the distinction between 
nonfeasance and misfeasance as itself an accident of positive law, a 
demarcation among the plurality of suitably relational duties that 
must be explained in terms of something non-relational. Yet, it is dif-
ficult to see how such an explanation could go, because the distinc-
tion between nonfeasance and misfeasance pays no attention to the 
weightiness of the interests that are at stake. Not only does the law 
permit people to ignore the impact of their conduct on the interests of 
others if no right is at issue. It also distinguishes between types of 
conduct that are equivalent in their impact on plaintiff’s well-being 
or any other interest of plaintiff apart from the specifically legal in-
terests protected by rights. The idea of substantive standing cannot 
be brought in to solve this problem because it can be taken in two 
ways. It could just be a name applied on a case by case basis to what-
ever interests are regarded as weighty, in which case it reproduces 
the difficulty it was supposed to solve. Alternatively, it could be taken 
to correspond to the idea of rights to person and property and so gives 
up on ideas of social norms being incorporated and interests being 
regarded as weighty.70 By focusing on “weightiness,” the incorpora-
tion strategy runs together a hypothesis about why someone might 
think that it was important to protect rights to person and proper-
ty—because they matter to well-being—with an analysis of how the 
law conceptualizes them. The law does not conceptualize them as 
“weighty”; it conceptualizes them as rights. That is why, as Zipursky 
and Goldberg rightly observe, the law does not protect against pure 
economic loss, however weighty, but does protect against property 
damage and even trespass apart from their effects. 
 Juridical structure figures more prominently in Goldberg and 
Zipursky’s discussions of doctrine than in their theoretical recon-
 69.  For present purposes, I take no stand on how best to ground those structures. The 
key point is that the structures organize the ways in which people are entitled to use their 
means. For example, Adam Smith’s narrow category of “perfect rights” is grounded in the 
long term benefits for mankind of their recognitions but is supposed to comprehend rights 
to person and property and to provide grounds for enforcement. See SMITH, supra note 52, 
at 9. The structure on which Smith focuses can be characterized apart from the fact that 
positive law happens to have taken it up. 
 70.  Zipursky reports that issues of substantive standing first came to his attention in 
fraud cases in which plaintiff only recovers if she relies on a fraudulent misrepresentation 
made to her. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Substantive Standing, Civil Recourse, and Correc-
tive Justice, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 299, 301 (2011). It is difficult to see what relation this 
structure could bear to that of interests being weighty. The person who relies on a repre-
sentation made to her and the one who relies on one made to another person have the exact 
same interest in play, unless the interest itself is characterized in terms of the relation, 
rather than vice versa. 
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struction of it. In their exemplary essay on social host liability,71 they 
operate with a firm grasp of the relation between the abstract and 
contextual. By distinguishing between a social host and a tavern op-
erator, they draw attention to the way in which various activities are 
conducted in this society as a way of characterizing what counts as 
being careful and towards whom. On a sufficiently thin characteriza-
tion of foreseeability, both the social host of a party to which guests 
bring their own alcoholic beverages and the tavern keeper can foresee 
that their activities might lead to injury to users of the road as a re-
sult of drunk driving. The only way to distinguish them is to focus on 
the kind of activity, distinguishing between providing people with 
intoxicating substances and providing a venue in which people con-
sume their own. But of course, just as abstract norms do not apply 
themselves to particulars, so, too, characterizations of activity-types 
do not apply themselves either. Instead, the salience of a particular 
activity depends in part on how it is understood in the society. At the 
same time, how it is understood needs to be parsed in terms of the 
fundamental legal concepts, such as the distinction between serving 
someone a mind altering substance and providing them with a venue 
to do what they will, knowing that serving such substances to them-
selves are among the things they will do. Such abstract concepts 
could perhaps without injustice be applied differently in a different 
society, but their social application is the way in which these people 
in this society do apply them. Looking to such factors, then, is not 
just the incorporation of an antecedent social norm; it is the applica-
tion of a general requirement of right to a particular activity, which 
is classified in terms of a social norm. 
C.   Remedies 
The same general structure applies to the issue of remedies. In 
determining plaintiff’s right to get back what she already had, the 
court must first make a determination of what she had, including 
both what power or object it was and how she was using it. Any such 
determination will inevitably be contextual and will depend, to some 
extent, on how things are understood (or misunderstood) in the socie-
ty. Goldberg and Zipursky repeatedly contend that “make whole” 
damages are at most a “default.”72 Yet, their status even as a default 
is baffling from the point of view of civil recourse understood as do-
mesticated anger. Their legal role in harm-based torts is not only as a 
default, which a court might reject in favor of some other measure. 
Instead, they provide the basis on which any further heads of damag-
 71.  John C.P. Goldberg, Social Host Liability and Beyond: How to Think About Inter-
vening Wrongdoing (Sept. 2007) (on file with author).   
 72.  Cf. Goldberg, supra note 48, at 443-44 (characterizing as a “guideline”).   
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es are built. That is why harm-based torts enable defendant to avoid 
liability by identifying a supervening non-tortious cause of plaintiff’s 
injury: by showing that he did not deprive plaintiff of anything to 
which she had a right against him, defendant addresses neither her 
grief nor her sense of grievance but does show that making her whole 
is not the expression of a constraint on defendant’s behavior. On this 
understanding, rights and remedies are seamless. Not only do the 
rights of plaintiffs form an integrated system; remedies give effect to 
that system. 
 I do, however, want to pause to note that the “injustice” charge 
that Goldberg and Zipursky lay against tort law is itself unjust. 
Let me repeat the passage about eggshell plaintiffs, which I regard 
as representative:  
Successful tort plaintiffs will sometimes be entitled to something 
more than “justice” demands or even permits, at least if justice is 
understood as the achievement of a just distribution of gains and 
losses as between tortfeasor and victim. Here, the most obvious 
example is the eggshell plaintiff, who may stand to recover a huge 
amount of compensation from a minimally culpable defendant. It 
is questionable whether justice is being done in such cases, but our 
tort system authorizes this sort of outcome because tort law is not 
a scheme for restoring a normative equilibrium as between doer 
and sufferer. It is, for better and worse, a law for the redress of 
private wrongs.73
 To the contrary, the eggshell plaintiff’s recovery is a matter of jus-
tice. She recovers because she has been wronged; the extent of the 
injury determines the extent of the wrong and so, too, of the remedy. 
Perhaps Goldberg and Zipursky suppose that the only form of justice 
that counts would be the achievement of a “just distribution of gains 
and losses as between tortfeasor and victim,”74 or one that makes lia-
bility a function of culpability. But any such form of justice, if indeed 
there is one, is comparative and only derivatively relational. And it 
 73.  Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 19, at 1581. Compare Zipursky’s earlier formulation: 
Our moral convictions about the existence and extent of a tortfeasor’s duties of 
repair are sensitive to an array of features extrinsic to whether there was a 
wrongful injury to the plaintiff and what would make the plaintiff whole. These 
features include, for example, whether and how badly the victim needs com-
pensation, not just her entitlements; what funds the defendant can draw on to 
compensate the plaintiff; and whether there are other claims on those funds.  
Zipursky, supra note 2, at 729. Even if these are “our moral convictions,” they could at 
most be relevant to the issue of whether plaintiff’s “entitlement” should prevail over them, 
not whether plaintiff has such an entitlement as a matter of justice. The latter formulation 
is more interesting because it addresses that issue head on. The two formulations are alike, 
however, in objecting to corrective justice as an account of law by introducing an undiffer-
entiated idea of morality, showing that the law does not conform to it and concluding that 
the law therefore does not meet the requirements of corrective justice. 
 74.  Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 19, at 1581.   
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gives no ground for connecting plaintiff and defendant for purposes of 
the comparison of their non-relational features. Indeed, such a con-
ception would have no room for the idea of a relational wrong at all, 
since it seems to presuppose that the wrong itself (and so the right 
that it violates) are matters of degree antecedent to the transaction 
between plaintiff and defendant. Perhaps this is what leads Goldberg 
and Zipursky to draw the sharp distinction that they do between 
wrongs and remedies, since their characterization of wrongs already 
abstracts from considerations of gain, loss, and comparative culpabil-
ity. If, as they contend, tort law is a law of wrongs, however, then any 
righting of those wrongs must have the same formal structure as the 
wrongs themselves. The eggshell plaintiff recovers because she has 
been wronged, that is, because her right has been invaded. The right 
itself neither has nor lacks a magnitude or an extent, but the object 
of the right, and so the object of the invasion, has one. Defendant’s 
wrongful act deprives plaintiff of something to which she had a right. 
The fact that depriving her turned out to be much more expensive 
than depriving others is not relevant; all that matters is that she has 
been wronged. The extent of an injury is just the extent of the inva-
sion of her right, and so all that she gets back is what any plaintiff 
gets back, namely what she already had as a matter of right.75 That 
is why plaintiff recovers; she is still entitled to that of which defend-
ant deprived her, and her claim against the defendant depends on 
the fact that a right has been violated, not on the specifics of the ob-
ject of the right, and so, as a special case of this, it does not depend 
on how expensive it is to compensate her. In other places, Goldberg 
and Zipursky raise the same objection in cases in which minor negli-
gence leads to massive liability for lost income.76 It may be that they 
mean to include such cases in the eggshell category. They are dis-
tinct, but no more difficult for corrective justice to explain: Having 
 75.  It is not clear why, on the recourse theory, if it is distinct from corrective justice, 
thin-skulled plaintiffs would recover for the full extent of their injuries. Why would the 
measure of plaintiff’s recourse be the extent of plaintiff’s injury? Why would the law em-
power someone to recover on the basis of his or her own vulnerability rather than the way 
in which a typical or ordinary person others would respond to the same wrong? More gen-
erally, why would questions of the extent of injury be relevant to the extent of liability at 
all rather than making the fact of injury the trigger of liability measured in some other 
way, which was presented as the feature that distinguished civil recourse from corrective 
justice? Conversely, it is not clear why, on recourse theory, the ultrasensitive plaintiff rule 
would be part of the law of tort. The person who foreseeably, or even knowingly, causes 
injury to an unusually sensitive plaintiff is not liable. Yet, such a plaintiff has every reason 
to be aggrieved. Moreover, such an aggrieved plaintiff is blocked from taking matters into 
his or her own hands. Why, then, would there be no remedy? By contrast, on the corrective 
justice view, the reasonable person standard, the thin-skull rule, and the ultrasensitive 
plaintiff rule form an integrated set because they are all derived from the basic idea of each 
person’s entitlement to what he or she already has.  
 76.  See, e.g., Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 14, at 1140-43; Goldberg & Zipursky, 
supra note 19, at 1581. 
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deprived her of something to which she had a right, defendant there-
by deprived her of the use of that thing; if that thing was a chattel, 
defendant would have deprived her of the use to which she would 
otherwise have put it; if instead defendant deprived her of her skin, 
defendant thereby deprived her of the protection her skin would have 
afforded her.  
D.   Powers and the Plaintiff’s Initiative 
In the passage just quoted and others like it, it appears that Gold-
berg and Zipursky’s rejection of corrective justice theory views it as 
an account which describes a pattern of benefits and burdens. Per-
haps the contention that the fact that a tort suit is initiated by plain-
tiff, rather than by the state, provides an objection to corrective jus-
tice depends on a similar conception of what corrective justice must 
be. If corrective justice were concerned with achieving or restoring a 
pattern of holdings, then it would indeed be a mystery why litigation 
is initiated by the plaintiff rather than the state. After all, if the state 
is involved in seeing to it that justice is done, why leave it to the 
plaintiff’s initiative? Indeed, if justice is important, it might be 
thought that it is too important to be left in plaintiff’s hands. As 
Zipursky remarks, “A right of action is a privilege and a power, and 
the state is not committed to the normative desirability of its exer-
cise, only to the right to have it.”77
 Goldberg and Zipursky develop this point by arguing that if tort 
represented the principle of corrective justice, the defendant would be 
under a duty to make repair quite apart from plaintiff’s power to de-
mand it. If justice requires that a wrong be undone, then it would not 
be up to the victim of the wrong to decide whether to initiate proceed-
ings against the wrongdoer. They suggest that were the law con-
cerned to see to it that justice is done, in the case of a private wrong, 
the state would step in to enforce the right in something like the way 
in which some criminal fraud statutes require that the fraud repay 
those who have been duped and do not make the repayment condi-
tional on any act on the part of the dupes. That is not, however, how 
the law of tort works; it gives the aggrieved plaintiff a power to pro-
ceed against a wrongdoer, but whether to exercise that power is left 
entirely at plaintiff’s discretion. 
 Goldberg and Zipursky are certainly right to draw attention to the 
fact that the power lies in the hands of the plaintiff. Only plaintiff 
may compel defendant to repair the wrong. From this they conclude 
further that defendant is not under any legal duty to repair the 
wrong, since, they assume, were defendant under such a duty, then it 
would be within the purview of the state (or, for that matter, almost 
 77.  Zipursky, supra note 2, at 741. 
2011]  SEPARATION OF WRONGS AND REMEDIES 199
anyone) to see to it that defendant does its duty.78 As Zipursky puts 
it, “The courts in tort law do not stand ready to facilitate the rectifi-
cation of wrongdoing, or to restore a normative equilibrium, as cor-
rective justice theorists maintain. Instead, they empower individuals 
to obtain an avenue of recourse against other private parties.”79
 If this structural feature of the law is to count as an objection to 
the corrective justice account, however, Goldberg and Zipursky would 
need to establish that the corrective justice account would lead to a 
different structure. If corrective justice were a matter of an appropri-
ate balance of benefits and burdens as between plaintiff and defend-
ant, it would be unclear why plaintiff in particular would have the 
power to enforce it. If it were a balance of benefits and burdens, then 
any party capable of bringing about the right balance would be under 
the same kind of duty to do so, or, at least, the party generally 
charged with whatever duties of distributive justice are applicable 
would be so charged.  
 If Goldberg and Zipursky were correct to characterize corrective 
justice in this way, then it would indeed be all but conclusive against 
an account of tort law in terms of corrective justice to point out that 
the aggrieved victim, rather than the state, commences a tort action. 
It would be decisive to contend that consequential damages in gen-
eral and thin-skull damages in particular show that gains and losses 
are not distributed in accordance with culpability. More generally, 
the fact that the law does not act directly against defendant, but ra-
ther empowers plaintiff to do so is fatal to any view that makes cor-
rective justice be a pattern of holdings that a court is charged with 
generating. All of these objections start from the thought that correc-
tive justice must be conceived as a goal and tort law as a more or less 
reliable instrument for achieving the goal; each objection points out, 
in its own way, that tort law looks nothing like an optimal tool for 
achieving the goal, so understood. 
 But corrective justice is nothing like that; it is not the characteri-
zation of a worthwhile goal to be achieved. It follows that it is not a 
distributive theory, not even a small-scale version of distributive jus-
tice between plaintiff and defendant. It is not a theory of desert or 
proportionality, not an attempt to approximate a normative order in 
which suffering is proportionate to wickedness. Nor is corrective jus-
tice properly understood, as Goldberg and Zipursky contend some 
scholars have understood it, as a matter of loss allocation.80 Allocat-
ing losses, at least as they characterize it, is an end to be achieved, 
and the question of who would do the best job of achieving such an 
 78. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 3, at 957-60. 
 79.  Zipursky, supra note 2, at 755. 
 80.  See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 3, at 926 (discussing Coleman and Perry). 
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end is, again, an open question with no presumption in favor of leav-
ing the task in the hands of the plaintiff. 
 Nor does corrective justice ask “Prosser’s question” about what to 
do when faced with a negligent defendant and an innocent plaintiff. 
It is almost as though, having seen through Prosser-style doctrinal 
legal realism, Goldberg and Zipursky find themselves not fully able 
to accept that anyone could be even more extreme in rejecting it. But 
that is exactly the position of corrective justice. 
 Instead of being a matter of either distributive justice or loss allo-
cation, corrective justice is concerned with rights governing the ways 
in which people are permitted to use their means in setting and pur-
suing their purposes. As a doctrine of means, in the sense character-
ized above, corrective justice makes every question of how a person’s 
means are to be used a question that is, in the first instance, for that 
person to decide. I can permit you to do what would otherwise be a 
wrong against me, I can enter into contractual arrangements with 
you, and I can acquiesce in what would otherwise be your unilateral 
creation of novel legal relations between us. That is, it is a general 
feature of every private right that “the state is not committed to the 
normative desirability of its exercise, only to the right to have it.”81
Within this structure, it is not merely unsurprising but inevitable 
that plaintiff alone is entitled to decide whether or not to stand on his 
or her rights in cases of wrongdoing. That is a general feature of a 
right as between private parties; the right holder determines wheth-
er to enforce it. If, as the corrective justice account contends, a right 
survives its own violation, the bearer of the right is the one who is 
entitled to decide whether to exercise the surviving right.  
 Moreover, because corrective justice is a principle for courts, it 
governs the binding arbitration of private disputes; it does not de-
mand that disputes be resolved. The parties are free to negotiate 
whatever resolution they regard as satisfactory; the court concerns 
itself not with negotiation but with arbitration.  
 The familiar requirement that the plaintiff proceed against de-
fendant reflects both the rights that are at issue and the role of a 
court as arbiter of disputes. Because it regards damages as grounded 
in and restoring the right that defendant has breached, Kantian 
right regards the right to damages as having the structure of every 
other right, and so something that plaintiff can invoke or decline to 
invoke. A right constrains the conduct of others, but the bearer of the 
right determines whether to exercise it. In this, a remedial right is no 
different from the primary right. It follows from this analysis that a 
tort suit must be initiated by plaintiff, simply because plaintiff, or 
someone authorized to act on plaintiff’s behalf, is the only one with 
 81.  Zipursky, supra note 2, at 741. 
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standing to exercise any right that she has. That she can only exer-
cise it through the court’s procedures does not make it any different. 
The role of the court does place the onus on plaintiff to establish the 
elements of the wrong against her, but that requirement is a way of 
enforcing rights, not an alternative to their enforcement.  
 This structure of the right holder deciding whether to enforce a 
right is familiar in the traditional rule according to which the remedy 
in cases of nuisance is an injunction. Although American law has 
moved away from this idea,82 the rest of the common law world has 
continued to follow the rule laid down in Shelfer v. City of London 
Electrical Lighting Co.,83 according to which an injunction is the rem-
edy for a nuisance except in those cases in which the injury is small, 
easily compensated, and easily calculated, and the injunction would 
serve only to enable the plaintiff to oppress the defendant. In order to 
be granted an injunction, the plaintiff must establish that the de-
fendant’s conduct interferes with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of 
his or her land. That is, plaintiff must establish that defendant’s land 
use constitutes a legal wrong. At the same time, plaintiff could in-
stead decide to simply put up with defendant’s conduct. Plaintiff 
alone is charged with deciding, simply because it is plaintiff’s right 
that is at issue.  
 It is not a satisfactory response to this structure to insist that the 
injunction does not enforce plaintiff’s right to be free of the nuisance 
because if defendant owed plaintiff a duty of non-interference, the 
state would step in and enforce it instead. Yet, that is the apparent 
form of Goldberg and Zipursky’s objection in the case of damages 
where the objection faces the same difficulty. Indeed, the same equa-
tion of having a duty with the prospect of direct enforcement by a 
public authority leads ineluctably to the conclusion that tort law does 
not include duties of non-injury, as a public authority does not direct-
ly enforce them either.  
 If defendant owes plaintiff a duty as a continuation of the right 
defendant violated, plaintiff alone is entitled to decide whether to 
hold defendant to that duty. The power of enforcement is the power 
to give effect to a right that already exists.84 It is not an accident that 
a right can be enforced, and it is arguably an essential feature of le-
gal rights that a procedure be available for giving effect to them. But 
 82.  See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970). 
 83.  Shelfer v. City of London Electric Lighting Co., [1895] 1 Ch. 287 (A.C.) (Eng.).  
 84.  The same point applies to the right to exclude a trespasser. A landowner’s right to 
exclude empowers her to do so. If she declines or fails to do so, the state will not step in to 
do so instead. If a landowner fails to exclude for a sufficient period of time, the statute of 
limitations will apply, and a trespasser may gain a prescriptive right. The fact that the 
state plays no active role in enforcing a landowner’s right to exclude does not show that the 
power to exclude is analytically unrelated to a right.  
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the power granted presupposes the existence and validity of the 
rights in question. 
 It may be that Goldberg and Zipursky’s focus on plaintiff’s power 
is supposed to show that defendant is not subject to a duty, but ra-
ther merely a liability, and they mean to draw attention to the fun-
damental role of a court in ordering a remedy. This, too, is not an ob-
jection to the Kantian account but rather a direct implication of it. 
Just as legal institutions are required to determine the application of 
concepts of right to particulars, so, too, they are required to authorize 
the enforcement of rights.85 The rights of the parties provide the basis 
on which a court orders defendant to pay plaintiff, and in so doing 
empowers plaintiff to compel payment. The court must order the re-
sult because only a court is entitled to impose an enforceable re-
quirement on any specific person.86 The example of injunctions makes 
this point especially clear; because it is a coercive order, a court must 
order an injunction even though its content is identical to that of the 
duty to which it gives effect.  
 Kantian right thus sees that the specifically remedial aspects of 
tort law are continuous with the remedial aspects of, for example, 
contract law because the remedial aspects of each reflect the underly-
ing rights. It would be highly artificial to suggest that plaintiff in a 
contract action gets a right of recourse, displacing her tendency to-
wards private revenge, because she must, in her own name and of 
her own right, initiate proceedings against defendant who breached a 
contract with her and receives not only what defendant had promised 
but also consequential damages. It would be no less artificial to con-
tend that contract law is not concerned with holding defendants to 
the commitments they have undertaken because it only gives plain-
tiffs a power to proceed against them,87 or that there is no legal duty 
to pay for services for which one has contracted on the grounds that 
the state will not compel payment unless the creditor first demands 
it.88 Instead, a more natural way of thinking of both of these depart-
 85.  I explain this in more detail in Force and Freedom, RIPSTEIN, supra note 20, at 
107-44. Kant goes so far as to argue that the existence of procedures of public right, includ-
ing courts, making rights enforceable after the fact is the precondition of private rights 
surviving their own violation and, so being, conclusive rather than merely provisional. 
 86.  See Stephen Smith, Why Courts Make Orders (And What This Tells Us About 
Damages), 64 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 1, 1-37 (2011).  
 87.  See generally Nathan B. Oman, Consent to Retaliation: A Civil Recourse Theory of 
Contractual Liability, 96 IOWA L. REV. 529 (2011). Even in those cases when non-
expectation damages are awarded, whether based on reliance or restitution, the measure of 
the remedy is determined by the right violated.  
 88.  In an earlier article, Zipursky assimilated the corrective justice view to the 
Holmesian “disjunctive” account of contract, according to which a contract imposed on 
promisor the duty to either perform or pay damages; Zipursky’s suggestion was that if the 
remedy is the continuation of the duty in tort, then wrongdoing and its repair is an option 
available to defendants. Zipursky, supra note 48, at 70-76. Once more, this is not what 
corrective justice requires. The right survives its own violation in the sense that it contin-
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ments of private law is as systems of rights in which the remedial 
aspect follows the underlying rights and in which the procedure 
whereby plaintiff asserts a right against defendant serves to give ef-
fect to those rights.89 That there is such a procedure is fundamental to 
the enforceability and so to the force of those rights. But the procedure 
doesn’t have some other function apart from giving effect to the rights.  
V. CONCLUSION
 It is time to take stock. I have suggested that the features of tort 
law that Zipursky and Goldberg point to as evidence of the inadequa-
cy of corrective justice and the superiority of civil recourse are actual-
ly features that are not only consistent with corrective justice but of 
which corrective justice provides a superior and fully conceptual ac-
count. With respect to what we might call the narrow principle of civ-
il recourse, according to which plaintiff has a power to enforce a 
right, civil recourse is not merely consistent with, but required by, 
corrective justice. I have also argued that the attempt to distinguish 
a more ambitious idea of civil recourse, understood as domesticated 
anger and retaliation, must fail. Not only does it fail to integrate with 
the relational nature of duty; it also falls into the very sort of func-
tionalist instrumentalism that pragmatic conceptualism sought to 
leave behind. 
 In this concluding Section, I want to return to the general issue of 
what it is to give a conceptual account of an area of legal doctrine. 
Zipursky introduces the idea of pragmatic conceptualism in several 
                                                                                                                  
ues to constrain defendant, even if in changed circumstances different actions or omissions 
will be required to conform to the constraint. Moreover, the suggestion that the corrective 
justice view entails the Holmesian disjunctive view rests on a series of illicit inferences: 
first, the reduction of an imperative (“don’t do A!”) to a material conditional (“if A, then C”) 
is treated as which is subsequently transposed into a disjunction (“not A or C”). That 
Holmes would be happy with such a reduction comes as no surprise, given his embrace of a 
predictive theory of law formulated in terms of advice to the so-called “bad man.” See gen-
erally Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., Supreme Judicial Council of Mass., The Path of the Law, 
Address Before the Boston University School of Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in 10 HARV. L. REV.
457, 461 (1897). But the Holmesian approach is internally inconsistent, since it treats the 
resulting disjunction as an imperative. If defendant neither performs nor pays, whatever 
further results would follow would have to be added as yet another disjunct (perform or pay 
or face a contempt sanction) and so on ad infinitum. The same generality in the Holmesian 
approach permits the characterization of recourse in the same disjunctive terms: “If you 
injure another, you will be liable to recourse” is equivalent to “don’t injure or accept re-
course.” Goldberg and Zipursky rightly insist on the imperatival nature of duty, Goldberg 
& Zipursky, supra note 19, at 1575-77, and would presumably also regard a court order 
granting a remedy as an imperative. Having done so, they cannot deny corrective justice 
theory the modal resources to which they legitimately help themselves.  
 89.  In the unusual class of cases in which the right and power reside in separate per-
sons—cases of third party beneficiaries to contracts—the third party has a power to enforce 
a right that resides in another person. There is a doctrinal puzzle about how this can be so, 
but the puzzle cannot even be formulated unless the power is understood to be the power to 
enforce a right. 
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stages. He first takes note of recent developments in the philosophy 
of language, concentrating especially on holism about meaning and 
the importance of inference. He then focuses on the role of concepts 
in structuring practices and argues that the key to understanding 
law lies in the recognition that judges create law rather than merely 
elaborating it.90 The result is an account of what it is to explain a doc-
trinal area: 
On the sort of pragmatism I am considering, to understand the 
concepts and principles within an area of the law is to grasp from 
within the practices of the law the pattern of verbal and practical 
inferences that constitute the relevant area of the law. According-
ly, to explain some area of the law is, in part, to display the con-
cepts and principles the grasping of which constitutes understand-
ing the law, and to do so in such a way as to make that form of un-
derstanding available. A criterion for a successful explanation will 
be the capacity to see how the verbal and practical inferences with-
in the pattern “go on.” To understand a legal provision is to grasp 
the pattern of inferences that underlies how the law has been used 
and to be able to recognize a variety of scenarios in which the pro-
vision would or would not be exemplified.91
 I think this approach has much to recommend because, despite 
the novel wording, it is methodologically indistinguishable from the 
Kantian formalism advocated by Weinrib.92 Talk of “moves,” “mas-
tery,” “licence,” and “grasp” express the requirements of reasoning 
with concepts in a vocabulary borrowed from games and the exercise 
of bodily skill. However, following it through consistently leads to a 
narrow conception of the distinction between creating and elaborat-
ing law and with it to a rejection of the bifurcation between duties 
and remedies. That this bifurcation is given effect by the idea of in-
corporation, as deployed in relation to a social contractarian theory 
about the renunciation of private revenge, is not an accident.93 Here, 
 90.  See Zipursky, supra note 8 at 471-73. 
 91.  Id. at 473. 
 92.  Zipursky continues, “[T]he notion of the content of the law ‘itself’ is a notion of a 
domain of power for legal officials in which certain moves are licensed because they are 
part of what flows out of a mastery of the concepts within the law.” Id. at 475.  
 93.  Zipursky’s original essay on pragmatic conceptualism takes as its focus the high-
er-order or “meta” question of the status of the conceptual connections examined and artic-
ulated: How are they possible? This difference makes no difference to the debate between 
corrective justice and civil recourse. Are they, as Kant would have it, synthetic a priori, or 
are they, instead, just immanent in, because constitutive of, a way of doing things that a 
group of human beings in a particular time and place happen to have adopted for reasons 
that may remain shrouded in the mists of history? Do we work outward from abstract con-
cepts of right or inward from the structural features of existing law? Any such differences 
between the approaches can be ignored as they are irrelevant to the analysis of what this 
group of human beings is doing right now. If that is the question, then, exactly the same 
things need to be analyzed, in exactly the same way. Moreover, putting aside such purely 
philosophical concepts as the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, and 
that between a priori and a posteriori judgments, the same tools are available to both en-
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it seems to me, Goldberg and Zipursky abandon conceptualism at the 
very point at which it is able to most illuminate its subject matter 
because they drive a wedge between rights and remedies, and indeed, 
a wedge between a right and the power to enforce it.  
 When a court seeks to determine whether defendant owes plaintiff 
a duty or when a finder of fact seeks to determine whether defendant 
exercised reasonable care, the question at issue enters into a chain of 
reasoning, the conclusion of which will be a finding that defendant is 
or is not liable. A conceptual account of this reasoning must make 
each of the elements of the determination of liability potentially rele-
vant to the conclusion in support of which it is argued. If the court 
asks whether plaintiff was in the class of persons about whom de-
fendant should have been thinking as defendant went about his or 
her business, the court must consider whether this situation is suffi-
ciently similar to ones in which courts have found a duty in the past. 
That piece of reasoning looks to the settled law and interprets it in 
large part in terms of the familiar types of social expectations. It does 
not ask a question of the general form, “Is this what ordinarily goes 
on?” The same distinction applies with respect to standard of care: 
the court asks itself whether defendant was being careful enough by 
asking about the ways in which people who are careful towards oth-
ers are careful in this kind of situation. It does not ask whether de-
fendant’s conduct was ordinary or whether it was competent by any 
other standard. If it made the latter inquiry into either the case of 
duty or standard of care, whatever result it reached would be inert 
from the standpoint of any further reasoning in which it might en-
                                                                                                                  
terprises. All that either can do is focus on the form of reasoning that is involved. Whether 
it is characterized as a form of reasoning, or instead as a series of “moves” made in a “lan-
guage game” is neither here nor there, because, on either account, the only question is 
whether, within the form of reasoning/language game or practice, a certain type of move 
licenses another, that is, does the conclusion that defendant owed plaintiff a duty of care, 
and breached that duty, lead to the conclusion that defendant must pay? Or is some other 
step required, apart from the analysis of the rights of the parties and what follows from 
them? There is also an apparatus common to both accounts, according to which we must 
ask who has standing to make various claims. It is no surprise that this should be so be-
cause the conceptualist elements in pragmatism, like the conceptualist elements in Kanti-
an philosophy, owe a substantial historical debt to juridical ideas, in particular, the juridi-
cal idea of standing. That is not to say that they are derivative of this idea, but only that 
they employ it freely, and do so legitimately, whether concerned with law or with the phi-
losophy of language, in so far as they are concerned with relations between human beings 
and the claims that one person may establish in relation to others. But all of this is to say 
that, in David Lewis’s lovely turn of phrase, there must be “scorekeeping in a language 
game.” David K. Lewis, Scorekeeping in a Language Game, 8 J. PHIL. LOGIC 339, 359
(1979). So this “meta” difference is not going to make any difference at all to any of the 
claims about the organizing concepts of that practice. And so it cannot possibly decide be-
tween civil recourse and corrective justice, nor even rule out the hypothesis that I have 
been pressing, namely that civil recourse is the way in which corrective justice is given 
effect. This is not merely an empirical claim about American law, but, more ambitiously, 
an analysis of what it is for one private person to have a right against another private per-
son, namely, for the first person to have standing to enforce that right.  
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gage. If it asks the former question, by contrast, the question is al-
ways part of a larger inquiry as to whether defendant violated any 
right of plaintiff. The duty question asks whether there was a right, 
and the standard of care question (together with causation and re-
moteness) enters into the determination of whether the right was vio-
lated. In deploying this structure, judges can be said to be making 
law in a genuine, if narrow, sense; the law develops across time, and 
often a decision can go more than one way. Any specific determination 
goes on to shape the space within which subsequent cases are decided.  
 Goldberg and Zipursky grasp this point when they focus on duty 
but fail to recognize that the conceptual structure of duty must be 
preserved throughout the pattern of reasoning. Further, the claim to 
recourse when plaintiff is wronged can only be part of the same con-
ceptual account that begins with the concept of duty—can only be the 
conclusion of a set of inferences in which duty is a basic premise—if 
recourse itself stands in inferential, rather than merely psychological 
or causal, relation to the underlying duties. 
 The domesticated revenge account of remedies also fails to fit into 
the kind of reasoning that is at issue in tort litigation. In order to de-
termine whether a remedy is adequate as domesticated revenge, a 
court would either need to do a careful psychological study of the par-
ticular plaintiff or, if it used broader categories, need to know what 
kinds of plaintiffs are likely to come forward, what it will take to sat-
isfy them, and so on. No such factors enter into a court’s reasoning. 
Instead, most of the argument about remedy—the determination of 
what plaintiff may exact from defendant—takes the form of argu-
ment about rights—how people are allowed to treat each other. 
Plaintiff’s contention that she has been wronged points to the nature 
of the duty the defendant owed to her, and defendant’s conduct in 
relation to that duty, and thus to her rights. That it should be so is no 
surprise; if her claim to a remedy is her claim to the continuation of a 
right, her claim to a remedy finally rests on the fact that she doesn’t 
cease to be entitled to constrain the defendant’s conduct in relation to 
what is hers simply because defendant did something inconsistent 
with that constraint. The assessment of damages then turns on an 
examination of the object of the right—of what did defendant deprive 
plaintiff and of what, if anything, further was the plaintiff thereby 
wrongfully deprived? Plaintiff’s leading of evidence with respect to 
the nature of her loss and the use that she was making or was about 
to make of the object of which she was deprived seem irrelevant to 
any question about placation. Yet, they are absolutely central to the 
question of right, of her entitlement to possess and use what is hers.  
 The bifurcation between rights and remedies is the fruit of the in-
corporation strategy, a focus on what legal institutions happen to 
have done rather than on what they are doing or how they are think-
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ing. Freed of the incorporation strategy and the resulting bifurcation 
of rights and remedies, civil recourse is what the law of tort would 
look like if it turned on the axis of corrective justice.  
